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PRECLUSION AND PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS IN RULE 23(b)(2) 
CLASS ACTIONS 
Mark C. Weber* 
The latest nontechnical amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rule that governs class actions, ap-
peared in 1966. One of the amendments provided that judg-
ments in class actions are binding on all unnamed class members 
whether the class wins or loses the case.1 Another amendment 
instituted the subdivision (b)(2) class action,2 and provided that 
the court in such an action does not have to issue any sort of 
notice to the class, either before or after adjudication, unless the 
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., Columbia University, 
1975; J.D., Yale Law School, 1978. I thank my colleagues Susan Bandes, Jeffrey Shaman, 
and Stephen Siegel for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. 
1. "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action . . . whether or not 
favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be mem-
bers of the class." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(3). Because the amended Rule includes the class 
members' claims in the judgment of the case, res judicata bars the members of the class 
from attempting to obtain a better result in any subsequent action. The Advisory Com-
mittee Note on the revised Rule states: 
Hitherto, in a few actions conducted as "spurious" class actions and thus nom-
inally designed to extend only to parties and others intervening before the deter-
mination of liability, courts have held or intimated that class members might be 
permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits favorable to their interests, 
in order to secure the benefits of the decision for themselves, although they 
would presumably be unaffected by an unfavorable decision. . . . Under pro-
posed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded; the action will have 
been early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the former case 
the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class .... 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprinted in Proposed Amendments to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 105-06 
(1966) [hereinafter Rule 23 Notes] (emphasis in original); see American Pipe & Constr. 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) ("The 1966 amendments were designed, in part, 
specifically . . . to assure that members of the class would be identified before trial on 
the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments."); 3B J. MooRE 
& J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 23.02-1 (2d ed. 1987) ("Subdivision (c)(3) 
makes clear that a judgment rendered in any type of class suit-(b)(l), (b)(2), or 
(b)(3)-is to have res judicata effect as to all members of the class, except as to those in 
the (b)(3) type who have opted out."). 
2. Subdivision (b)(2) comprises actions where the opponent of the class "has acted or 
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate 
final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(2). The entirety of Rule 23(b)(2) is quoted infra in text accompany-
ing note 19. 
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case is settled. 3 Thus, one provision of the current Rule binds all 
members of the class to the result in a subdivision (b)(2) action, 
barring them forever by res judicata from bringing a subsequent 
case, while the other dispenses with mandatory notice, so that 
the class members who are bound by the judgment may never 
learn of the pendency of the case. The juxtaposition of these 
provisions is striking. Together the provisions cause individuals 
to be bound by res judicata by cases they never knew existed. 
This situation seems patently unfair. 
The pre-1966 Rule permitted nonbinding class suits, called 
"spurious" class actions.• The named plaintiff could sue on be-
half of the class and obtain a decision in the class's favor. Class 
members could then opt in to get relief from the court.5 If the 
named plaintiff lost the case, the result did not bind the class 
members, who were free to file later lawsuits on the same claim, 
and win or lose on the merits without any application of res 
judicata against them.6 But the 1966 amendments to the Federal 
Rules abolished this procedure and made judgments in all class 
actions binding on the entire class. 7 Although one amendment 
required the court give written notice of the pendency of the suit 
to absent class members in cases predominantly for money dam-
ages,8 no provision was made for any mandatory notice in cases 
for injunctive and declaratory relief. 
3. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(2), (c)(3). This permissive notice scheme also applies to subdi-
vision (b)(l) cases, where separate, nonclass actions either would create inconsistent ad-
judications and incompatible standards of conduct for the opponent of the class or would 
as a practical matter preclude potential class members. By contrast, subdivision (b)(3), 
applying in cases where the relief sought relates "predominantly to money damages," 
requires the court to send written notice to all identifiable class members before class 
certification. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2). 
4. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 
ILL. L. REV. 555, 555-56 (1938). 
5. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. 
dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963). 
6. Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 
(1966). 
7. Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 105. 
8. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2). For reasons that will become apparent, this Article 
has no criticism of the preclusive effect that attaches to class action judgments in cases 
brought under Rule 23(b)(3). For various criticisms of Rule 23(b)(3), see Dam, Class 
Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 97; Mullenix, Class Resolution of the 
Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1039, 1056-58 
(1986). This Article also places to one side the issues of defendant class actions, treating 
the plaintiff class action as the important case for application of Rule 23(b)(2). Subdivi-
sion (b)(2) may even be literally inapplicable to defendant class actions. Henson v. East 
Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.) cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987); see infra 
note 220. But see Note, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1376-78 (1984) (arguing that the language of subdivision (b)(2) can 
apply to plaintiff's own conduct). In any event, it will be argued that the reform pro-
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This Article examines whether Rule 23(b)(2) violates the pro-
cedural due process9 rights of absent class members by binding 
them to the judgment in a class case without notice of the suit. 
It concludes that the Rule almost certainly violates due process 
and proposes a reform that would permit nonbinding class ac-
tions similar to the old "spurious" class suits. 
Part I of the Article considers the contemporary function of 
the Rule 23(b)(2) class action. It first examines in detail the par-
ticular types of cases currently being brought under the subdivi-
sion. It then discusses the necessity for class action treatment of 
these cases and considers the role that preclusion of class mem-
bers plays in some class suits. Part II describes how, under cur-
rent case law, the protections of procedural due process extend 
to intangible interests such as class members' unfiled causes of 
action for injunctive relief. Part III of this Article contrasts the 
apparent expectations of the framers of the 1966 amendments 
with the present state of practice under Rule 23(b)(2) and the 
present state of procedural due process law. 
Part IV of this Article argues that the individual class mem-
ber's cause of action is indeed protected by due process under 
the standards that the Supreme Court has come to apply. It 
then discusses the question of what process is due. It describes 
two possible ways of answering that question. The first approach 
looks to due process minima established by the Supreme Court 
for an unnamed class member's cause of action for damages in a 
recent case. Application of this analogy demonstrates that subdi-
vision (b)(2) violates due process. The second approach looks to 
a balancing of the individual's interests, the value of existing 
safeguards as opposed to other possible safeguards, and the 
value of preserving the status quo. The answer here is somewhat 
equivocal because the cost of the alternative safeguard of 
posed here is beneficial if subdivision (b)(2) is applied to defendant classes. See infra 
note 220. 
9. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No person shall 
... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. This duty has two dimensions. The first, procedural due process, re-
quires that the government, in making adjudications and other particularized decisions 
whose effect is the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, must meet standards of fair-
ness in the hearings or other processes that it uses. The second, substantive due process, 
prohibits the government from taking life, liberty, or property without adequate justifi-
cation, irrespective of the procedures it employs. Thus procedural due process has to do 
with the fairness of decisions in the courts and administrative agencies, and substantive 
due process has to do with the police power or other rational justification for statutory or 
executive acts that curtail rights. See generally J. Now AK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 321-25 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining distinction and discussing illustrative 
cases). This Article concerns only procedural due process, not substantive due process. 
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mandatory notice may well be elimination of subdivision (b)(2) 
in those cases where it serves the most important social func-
tion. Still, because the Rule affords no protection whatsoever to 
class members' rights to individualized hearings, the conclusion 
emerges that the Rule violates due process. 
Part V of this Article proposes a reform of the Rule that 
would eliminate the binding of class members who have no no-
tice of the pendency of the case. It describes the origins and op-
eration of nonbinding class actions under the pre-1966 Rules. It 
answers the objection to spurious class suits that led to their ab-
olition, that a suit that does not bind the class violates the prin-
ciples of mutuality of estoppel. Finally, it sketches the applica-
tion of nonbinding class suits to institutional cases, those in 
which a decree binding on the class serves an important function 
of judicial administration. It suggests that notice may be delayed 
in such cases until after a finding of liability and the costs of 
notice then properly shifted to the defendant. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY FUNCTION OF THE RULE 23(b)(2) CLASS 
ACTION 
In its twenty-two years of existence, subdivision (b)(2) · has 
contributed to the revolutions in civil and welfare rights that 
have marked the legal history of an era. 
A. The Explosion of Civil Rights and Antipoverty Litigation 
The 1966 amendments to Rule 23 arrived when the civil rights 
and antipoverty movements were at their peaks. Congress au-
thorized federally funded legal services for the poor in 1966.10 
The new poverty lawyers saw class action cases as a major vehi-
cle for reforming the law to benefit the poor, 11 just as lawyers 
10. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 215, 80 Stat. 
1451, 1462 (repealed 1981). By the end of 1967, there were nearly 2000 lawyers in these 
programs. S. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SocIETY's PooR LAW 179 (1969). Restrictions on feder-
ally-funded legal aid lawyers' activities under the Nixon administration resulted in a 
further shift in antipoverty legal efforts away from organizing demonstrations and politi-
cal actions by welfare, tenant, and other groups and towards more strictly "legal" activ-
ity designed to further antipoverty goals, such as class action civil cases. See Legal Ser-
vices Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(5) (1982). See generally Wexler, 
Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970) (arguing that, to be effective, 
poverty lawyers must engage in organizing demonstrations and similar activities). 
11. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 307 (1971). 
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working for equality for blacks saw the potential for class ac-
tions to change the laws and practices by which invidious racial 
discrimination operated.12 As the antiwar and environmental 
movements gathered momentum in the late sixties and early 
seventies, the lawyers at work in these campaigns also saw class 
actions as a useful means to vindicate their clients' rights. 13 By 
limiting removal jurisdiction in criminal cases, and by expanding 
the abstention doctrine in cases to enjoin criminal prosecutions, 
the Supreme Court may have contributed to a shift of civil 
rights efforts from criminal proceedings to mass civil cases such 
as class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(2).14 In the 1970's, 
Congress passed a variety of fee-shifting statutes. 1 ~ The en-
hanced availability of attorneys' fees provided a further incen-
tive to bring major litigation such as class actions to further the 
goals of client groups.18 
The Rule 23(b)(2) class action was ideal for civil rights and 
antipoverty litigation. Indeed, the framers of the subdivision 
used civil rights actions as the main illustration of Rule 
23(b)(2)'s use.17 Subdivision (b) provides: 
12. Note, Class Actions: A Study of Group-Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 
991 (1956). 
13. See Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967) (class action suit against 
prosecution of antiwar protesters for disorderly conduct), aff'd, 391 U.S. 353 (1968); cf. 
R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND Poucv 316 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing 
environmental class action litigation). 
14. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (requiring abstention where prior state 
criminal case is pending); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) (limiting 
criminal removal jurisdiction). 
15. E.g., Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Act 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 505(b), 92 Stat. 2982, 2983 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794a 
(1982)); Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 
Stat. 2641, 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). 
16. Even before the passage of fee-shifting statutes, class actions were an exception 
to the general rule against the awarding of attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs. See 
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939). The exception applied most 
clearly to class actions where the relief preserved or created a common fund, because the 
fees came from the fund itself. Id. Some decisions under fee award statutes increase the 
award on the basis of the significance or complexity of the case, for instance, where the 
case is a class action. E.g., Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 685 (S.D.N.Y.), atf'd 
mem., 671 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). 
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that classwide relief alone does not justify in-
creasing a fee award. 465 U.S. at 900. 
17. Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 102 ("Illustrative of actions under subdivision 
(b)(2) are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with discrimi-
nating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific 
enumeration."). The Advisory Committee Note also gives hypothetical examples of the 
subdivision's use in a commercial context, but without explaining why plaintiffs in such 
cases would wish to bar themselves from relief that is "predominantly . . . money dam-
ages." Id. 
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Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be main-
tained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision 
(a)18 are satisfied, and in addition: 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a 
whole. 19 
Civil rights and antipoverty litigation fit the subdivision (b)(2) 
mold when a defendant's illegal conduct affects large numbers of 
the poor or of a disfavored racial group. Plaintiffs in such ac-
tions hope to eliminate these policies and practices. They may 
also be interested in monetary relief, but in many cases, such 
relief can be characterized as equitable, and thus fits literally 
into the term "injunctive relief. "20 Declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, moreover, are often all the relief that is available because 
the courts have applied sovereign immunity and other doctrines 
to restrict monetary relief in cases against the government. 21 In 
these cases, the subdivision (b)(2) suit provides an attractive 
means of redress. 
By contrast, there are strong practical disincentives to framing 
the action as one under subdivision (b)(3). Subdivision (b)(3) re-
quires the court to find "that the questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy," requirements that do not apply 
to subdivision (b)(2) class actions. Subdivision (b)(3) also re-
18. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) lists four prerequisites: 
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) 
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses 
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, 
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class. 
19. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b). 
20. For example, an award of unlawfully withheld welfare benefits may be character-
ized as equitable restitution. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd 
sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Back-pay awards in employment dis-
crimination actions provide another example, because they are considered restitution, 
not damages. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
21. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (applying federal sovereign 
immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (applying eleventh amendment im-
munity); see infra text accompanying notes 34-38. 
SPRING 1988] Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions 353 
quires named plaintiffs to notify the absent class members of 
the proposed class action and of their right to be excluded from 
it. 22 The Supreme Court ruled in 197 4 that a district court could 
not shift the cost of notice in a subdivision (b)(3) case to the 
defendant upon a showing of likelihood of success in the ac-
tion. 23 If the class representative is indigent-a common situa-
tion in antipoverty or civil rights cases-there will be no way to 
pay the postage, printing, and distribution costs. In contrast to 
subdivision (b)(3), subdivision (b)(2) does not require notice 
before class certification. The only notice that is likely to be re-
quired is notice of a proposed settlement, if one is reached.2• In 
that event, the parties can agree to shift the cost as part of the 
settlement. 
B. Types and Functions of Rule 23(b) (2) Class Actions 
Antipoverty and civil rights cases continue to be among the 
most frequently filed class actions.211 As a practical matter, Rule 
23(b)(2) class actions, whether antipoverty, civil rights, or 
others, now fall into two categories. 26 
22. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2): 
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to 
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reason-
able effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude 
the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the 
judgment whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request 
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the mem-
ber desires, enter an appearance through counsel. 
23. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). For a fuller discussion of Ei-
sen, see infra text accompanying notes 182-89. 
24. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of 
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. C1v. P. 23(e). 
25. Civil rights actions constituted the largest category of federal class cases filed in 
1985, with 28.5% of the total, a decline from 37.3% in 1984. 1985 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFF. 
U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 555. These figures do not divide class actions into those brought 
under subdivision (b)(l), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Other major categories of class actions include 
securities and commodities actions (14.4%) and contract actions (21.7%). Id. Because of 
the likelihood of monetary relief in these latter kinds of actions, it stands to reason that 
they are largely subdivision (b)(3) actions. By the same token, a higher proportion of 
civil rights actions are probably subdivision (b)(2) actions. 
26. This breakdown draws upon various commentators' descriptions of categories of 
injunctive relief, e.g., 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8-12 (1978); Laycock, In-
junctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule (Book Review), 57 Tux. L. REV. 1065, 1073-75 
(1979), as well as other commentators' descriptions of modern complex litigation, e.g., 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 
(1976). 
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1. Public policy cases- The first category is the public pol-
icy case, where the plaintiffs challenge a legal rule or an admin-
istrative policy or practice and seek to have it declared contrary 
to supervening constitutional provisions, statutes, or regulations. 
Many antipoverty cases fit into this group. An example would be 
an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a pro-
posed cut in welfare benefits on the theory that the cut violates 
a federal statute.27 All the relief needed in such a case is a sim-
ple prohibitory injunction against the proposed policy of the 
defendant. 
Some public policy cases have an added dimension. They seek 
not only an injunction against a policy of the defendant, but also 
significant monetary relief, or relief that will have some other 
individual benefit for the people harmed by the policy. An ex-
ample of such a case would be one challenging a state's practice 
of delaying decision on applications for federally assisted welfare 
benefits beyond the deadlines established in federal regula-
tions. 28 Here, the plaintiffs would seek an injunction prohibiting 
delay of decision on the applications beyond the federal dead-
lines and requiring that the persons who had lost benefits be-
cause of illegal delays either be paid them or at least be notified 
of their right to claim them through state administrative or judi-
cial procedures.29 Another example would be an employment 
discrimination action against a private employer, where the 
27. E.g., Illinois Welfare Rights Coalition v. Miller, No. 81-C-7118 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 
1981) (order granting preliminary injunction). The Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2017b 
(1982), prohibits states from taking the receipt of food stamps into account in computing 
welfare grants. In Illinois Welfare Rights Coalition, the evidence indicated that the state 
welfare department had calculated a standard of subsistence for welfare recipients, sub-
tracted the food stamp amount to which the recipients were entitled, and reduced wel-
fare benefits for the recipients to that level. The court found a likelihood of success on 
plaintiffs' claim that this policy violated the Food Stamp Act and issued a classwide 
preliminary injunction. 
28. E.g., Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
29. E.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). In the Quern litigation, plaintiffs orig-
inally asked that defendants be ordered to calculate and pay the amounts that the wel-
fare recipients would have received if their applications had been decided within the 
deadlines. But in 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that the eleventh amendment to the 
United States Constitution prohibits a federal court from ordering the director of a state 
agency to make retroactive welfare payments. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
Though monetary relief as such is barred, the Court, six years after Edelman, ruled 
that it was permissible to enter an injunction requiring the state to notify all the class 
members of their right to make a claim for the benefits by use of state administrative 
and judicial procedures. Quern, 440 U.S. at 347. Accordingly, in cases challenging ex-
isting welfare or other state governmental policies that have resulted in class members 
being deprived of monetary benefits, it is common to ask that a defendant protected by 
eleventh amendment immunity be ordered to notify all members of the class of the 
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plaintiffs seek a prospective injunction against the discrimina-
tory practices, as well as retroactive promotions, back pay, and 
other retrospective equitable remedies for past discrimination 
against the class members. 30 
The function of the class action status of these cases is far 
from obvious. On first glance, it seems that if individual cases 
were to challenge government policy on statutory or constitu-
tional grounds, a change in policy would occur by the stare deci-
sis effects of the individual decision. Government administrators 
frequently disregard the results of individual challenges to gov-
ernment policy, however. An individual action may achieve relief 
for the plaintiff and create precedent, but fail to change the poli-
cies or general practices of government. 31 
The most celebrated recent instance of this practice involved 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who would 
"nonacquiesce" in unfavorable court decisions regarding Social 
Security benefits. "Nonacquiescence" refers to the refusal to 
obey a court's decision except in the individual case that the 
court has decided. The practice achieved notoriety when the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denounced it as conduct 
placing the Social Security Administration above the law. 32 
means by which they can seek monetary relief through state administrative procedures. 
Courts ordering such notice may order the defendant to include a mail-in claims form. 
Quern, 440 U.S. at 336, 349. 
30. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 
31. See generally Kamp, Adjudicating the Rights of the Plaintiff Class: Current 
Procedural Problems, 26 ST. Loms U.L.J. 364, 375-77 (1982) (discussing practical and 
personal reasons behind litigants' filing of class actions); Wilton, The Class Action in 
Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 B.U.L. REV. 597, 599-600 (1983) (same). 
32. Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1500-03 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 
469 U.S. 1082 (1984). The Secretary's practice has been challenged in several class ac-
tions where classes have sued to obtain court orders running in favor of all similarly 
situated Social Security claimants to prevent the Secretary from disregarding legal inter-
pretations favorable to them. Courts hearing these cases have entered class injunctive 
relief. E.g., id.; Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1016-19 (D. Minn. 1984); Hyatt v. 
Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 1002 (D.N.C. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985). 
Under the pressure of the class action cases, the Secretary has ceased nonacquiescence of 
some individual decisions. The principal instance was the Secretary's failure to use 
court-imposed standards for redetermining eligibility for disability benefits. Although 
the Secretary ceased using her former standards for these cases, this change was spurred 
by legislative action as well as by court decisions. See Social Security Disability Benefits 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2, 98 Stat. 1794, 1794-96 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 423(0, 1382c(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1986)). The policy of nonacquiescence neverthe-
less remains available for use by the Secretary in other contexts. The continued availa-
bility of nonacquiescence despite the Secretary's actions is discussed in Maranville, Non-
acquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. 
L. REV. 471, 531 (1986), and Note, Social Security Administration in Crisis: Nonacquies-
cence and Social Insecurity, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89, 91 (1986). See gene,:ally Stieberger 
v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (briefly discussing new policy). 
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The nonacquiescence practice of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services is hardly an isolated instance of governmental 
disregard of individual case precedent. This conduct abounds in 
such fields as welfare law and education administration33 and 
might be thought of as a predictable backlash against some of 
the legal thrusts of the civil rights and antipoverty movements. 
There should be no surprise that an administrator who defended 
a practice in one individual challenge would want to continue it 
as long as possible. The administrator can always argue that the 
court was wrong, and that the administrator did not appeal the 
adverse judgment because of a decision not to expend the re-
sources, rather than because of agreement with the court's deci-
sion. Various contemporary legal rules allow administrators to 
nonacquiesce formally or informally with complete impunity. 
One such rule prohibits awarding compensatory damages in 
actions over the failure to make government benefit payments. 
Damages awards and the threat of future damages awards are a 
powerful means to induce potential defendants to comply with 
legal rules established by precedent. For instance, if Social Se-
curity claimants whose benefits were illegally cut off could sue 
33. Eichel, "Respectful Disagreement": Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals Precedents, 18 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 
463, 468-70 (collecting cases); Maranville, supra note 32, at 475-86 (collecting cases); see, 
e.g., ITI World Communications v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (FCC failure to 
obey Second Circuit precedent); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 
(3d Cir. 1979) (NLRB refusal to follow Third Circuit precedent); Goodman's Furniture 
Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 561 F.2d 462, 464-65 (3d Cir. 1977) (Postal Service 
failure to obey precedent from Seventh and Eighth Circuits); Home Constr. Corp. v. 
United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir. 1971) (IRS refusal to follow Fifth Circuit 
precedent). 
An example of state government refusal to follow court precedent is Jamison v. 
Weaver, 30 Ill. App. 3d 389, 332 N.E.2d 563 (1975), where a welfare recipient, in an 
individual appeal from a cutoff of benefits, challenged the use of hearsay evidence in the 
appeal hearing. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that though the technical rules of 
evidence do not apply in welfare hearings, the rule against hearsay was not technical, but 
fundamental. Upon objection, hearing officers were obliged to exclude such evidence. 
Years later, however, the manuals of the Illinois Department of Public Aid and its in-
structions to hearings officers remained unchanged, and individual litigants were still 
going to the Illinois courts on administrative review actions, complaining of invalid cut-
offs because hearing officers did not sustain objections to hearsay evidence. E.g., Gallo-
way v. Quern, No. 78 L 5962, slip op. at 3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28, 1978); see also Parks v. 
Pavkovic, 557 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 753 F.2d 
1397 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 474 U.S. 918 (1985); Parks v. Illinois 
Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 110 Ill. App. 3d 184, 441 N.E.2d 
1209 (1982); Note, Judicial Review of Welfare Policy Under the Illinois Administrative 
Review Act, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 199, 223 (discussing additional Illinois Department of 
Public Aid cases). See generally Kelly & Rothenberg, The Use of Collateral Estoppel by 
a Private Party in Suits Against Public Agency Defendants, 13 U. M1cH. J.L. REF. 303, 
306-09 (1980) (discussing additional state government nonacquiescence cases). 
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for the actual harm they suffered-loss of utility service for fail-
ure to pay the bill, eviction for inability to pay the rent, un-
treated illness for failure to pay medical expenses-the award 
might deter the Secretary from retaining standards for cutoffs 
that have been found illegal. But under existing legal doctrine, 
the availability of compensatory relief in these circumstances 
appears illusory. All that the claimant will obtain in the subse-
quent action will be retroactive payment of benefits.34 The de-
fendant would pay no more than if it had acquiesced. No deter-
rent effect exists. 
A second legal rule that facilitates nonacquiescence is govern-
mental immunity from monetary liability. Because eleventh 
amendment and other immunity doctrines eliminate even lim-
ited monetary remedies such as retroactive payment, defendants 
have even less reason to comply with individual case decision.s in 
their future overall practices. These immunities create a finan-
cial incentive to delay obedience as long as possible. The Su-
preme Court's application of the eleventh amendment in the 
1974 Edelman v. Jordan3r, case to bar an award of retroactive 
welfare benefits was seen as a significant reaction to the welfare 
rights movement of the 1960's. Whatever impact the immunity 
doctrine had on the movement, it had a strong impact on wel-
fare lawyers, leading them to choose forms of litigation such as 
class actions for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, 
which enable the greatest number of people to obtain remedies 
as early in the case as possible. 36 "Good faith" immunity pro-
vides an additional barrier to damages by permitting adminis-
trators to protect themselves from personal liability while assert-
ing their disagreement with the courts. The Supreme Court held 
in 1975 that good faith immunity acts to bar damages in civil 
rights cases.37 Finally, a 1981 Supreme Court decision estab-
lished that punitive damages are unavailable from public agen-
34. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460, 2468-71 (1988) (requiring dismissal of ac-
tion for damages beyond back benefits under Social Security Act). Similar rules apply in 
other contexts. E.g., Burlington School Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 
(1985) (denying compensatory damages under Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act). 
35. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
36. See 0. F1ss, supra note 26, at 90. Other reasons, including the dire circumstances 
of typical welfare litigation plaintiffs, also induce lawyers to request immediate classwide 
injunctive relief in these cases. LaFrance, Federal Litigation for the Poor, 1972 LAW & 
Soc. ORDER 1, 111-12. 
37. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See generally Chilicky v. Schweiker, 796 
F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying good faith immunity to federal and state officials who 
participated in nonacquiescence policy), reu'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988). 
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cies in civil rights cases.38 Monetary remedies do not exist to de-
ter the administrators' recalcitrance. 
Even without the new legal rules noted here, if a defendant 
will not voluntarily apply the result of individual cases to the 
whole of the population with similar claims, the pure stare deci-
sis effect of the first decision is of only limited value. Those who 
could take advantage of it must first learn about the original 
case, then obtain counsel to file an additional lawsuit. They 
must argue the case all over again and face the risk of losing if 
the case is assigned to a different judge or appealed to a higher 
court than the one issuing the first decision. The government 
will almost always have more resources to litigate than the indi-
vidual, and if it cannot win, it can often wear out the plaintiff. 39 
Offensive collateral estoppel would seem to off er a means to 
obtain broad benefits from individual cases. Under the theory of 
offensive collateral estoppel, plaintiffs in actions following an in-
dividual case may prevent the same defendant from arguing that 
the practice challenged in the previous action was legal. Sum-
mary judgment would promptly follow in each instance:'0 A re-
cent decision of the United States Supreme Court, however, 
throws doubt on the vitality of this approach. In United States 
v. Mendoza,•n the Court ruled that nonmutual offensive collat-
eral estoppel could not be applied to preclude relitigation of due 
process issues pertaining to the denial of naturalization status to 
a Filipino immigrant. The applicant for naturalization argued 
that relitigation was barred by a district court decision that the 
United States never appealed, which held that denial of natural-
ization to Filipino applicants in identical circumstances violated 
due process.42 The Mendoza district court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit approved the application of offensive 
collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court, however, reversed. The 
38. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
39. Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Reliti-
gation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REv. 847, 855, 858 (1986). For the 
contrary view that individual suits can be effective in the public policy context, see Wil-
ton, supra note 31. Professor Wilton's confidence in good faith compliance with prece-
dent on the part of government officials appears unjustified in light of the prevalence of 
these officials' disobedience. Wilton emphasized, however, the significant fact that in 
some instances injunctive relief may be ordered in a nonclass action. Id. at 614-17. See 
infra note 45 (discussing this option). But Wilton does not acknowledge the barriers to 
the appealability of the denial of such relief. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
40. Wilton, supra note 31, at 613; see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 
(1979). 
41. 464 U.S. 154 (1984), rev'g 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982). 
42. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 
1975). 
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Court stressed such policy concerns as permitting the develop-
ment of legal questions in successive cases and permitting the 
Solicitor General to conserve resources or make a political deci-
sion not to appeal a case without the adverse effect of having the 
unappealed judgment bind in subsequent actions. These con-
cerns, it said, compelled the result, as long as no mutuality was 
present. Only if the parties in both cases were identical would 
the burden of repetitious litigation by the private party against 
the government, and the lessening of the bar to development of 
legal questions, require a different result."3 Of course, mutuality 
will not exist in cases by individuals against illegal government 
policies. The nature of such a case means that the potential 
plaintiffs will not be the same persons or entities in the first case 
and the ones that follow it: a person who obtains relief in the 
first case will have nothing to sue over. His or her individual 
claim will be moot. Other persons in the same situation will still 
need relief, but since they were not plaintiffs in the first lawsuit, 
there will be no mutuality with respect to them. Under Men-
doza, the potential plaintiffs will not be able to use offensive col-
lateral estoppel. 
By its facts and by the part of its reasoning that emphasizes 
the nationwide concerns of the Solicitor General, Mendoza ap-
plies only to federal government defendants. But any person 
framing a case against state or local government defendants 
must be sensitive to the risk that the rule might be applied to 
them as well. All governmental defendants can argue that an ec-
onomic or political decision not to appeal an individual's lone 
victory should not bind the government in all cases, forever. If 
such an argument prevails, the strategy of reliance on offensive 
collateral estoppel fails. Of course, there is no way to know of 
the failure until the subsequent case, so the person seeking a 
broad change of policy bears a significant risk in choosing to rely 
only on offensive collateral estoppel."" 
43. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 163; United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173-
74 (1984). 
44. For a more comprehensive critique of United States v. Mendoza, see Note, supra 
note 39. Pre-Mendoza articles placing reliance on offensive collateral estoppel include 
George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 
STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980); Kamp, supra note 31, at 373-74; Kelly & Rothenberg, supra 
note 33; Note, Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by Persons Opting Out of a 
Class Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189 (1980). For treatments emphasizing the relation be-
tween the absence of offensive collateral estoppel against the government and govern-
ment nonacquiescence, see Eichel, supra note 33, at 500-01; Maranville, supra note 32, at 
509-13. Professor Maranville notes the desirability of class actions in light of the absence 
of offensive collateral estoppel against the government. Id. at 530 n.198. 
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Individual actions seeking broad injunctive relief are not an 
adequate substitute for class actions in public policy cases. 
When an individual files a case asserting the illegality of a gov-
ernmental practice without making class action allegations and 
requests broad injunctive relief barring any application of the 
practice, the most frequently heard objections are that the indi-
vidual lacks the "standing" to obtain such a broad remedial or-
der, and that no one but the individual will be able to enforce 
the order in subsequent proceedings. Both these objections are 
dubious. The individual has standing, and any person in whose 
favor the order was made may enforce it.411 
45. The Supreme Court has made clear that the constitutional minimum of standing 
is simply personal injury of the plaintiff that is a result of the defendant's alleged viola-
tion of the law and that is likely to be remedied by some form of judicial relief. Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976). 
As long as there is a likelihood of benefit to the plaintiff from the relief sought, the 
plaintiff has the standing to seek it. The plaintiff merely needs to allege that she was a 
victim of the continuing operation of the policy or practice against which the injunction 
is sought. Others will benefit from the injunction as well, but this will not affect the 
named plaintiff's standing to obtain it. For a contrary view, see Rutherglen, Notice, 
Scope and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11, 19 (1983). Professor 
Rutherglen, however, does not discuss the applicable precedents. 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1978), the 
Supreme Court approved the entry .of an injunction prohibiting the exclusion of anyone 
from the defendants' medical school on account of the affirmative action program that 
the court declared unlawful. The case was not a class action. A similar case is Honig v. 
Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592, 600 (1988). Lower court opinions establishing an individual's right to 
secure broad injunctive relief in a nonclass action suit include Evans v. Harnett County 
Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982); Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 528 F.2d 
551, 557 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive 
Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289-90 (5th Cir. 
1963). Contra Zepeda v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 
719, 727-30 (9th Cir. 1985); McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 940 (2d Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). See generally D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REME-
DIES 229-30 (1985) (discussing individual actions to secure broad injunctive relief); 
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1195-96 (1982) (same). 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), is not to the contrary. There, the 
Court dismissed an individual claim for injunctive relief against any application of police 
chokehold policies on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. But the issue in 
Lyons was not the plaintiff's standing to obtain an injunction against the use of 
chokeholds on others; it was whether he had standing to obtain an injunction against the 
use of chokeholds at all, even as to himself. The Court held that there was insufficient 
probability shown that the conduct complained of would ever be repeated to justify the 
award of injunctive relief. The Court had earlier applied this same standard in a class 
action. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
A second potential difficulty with nonclass actions seeking broad injunctive relief is 
connected with the ability to enforce the injunction if, after the conclusion of the litiga-
tion, the individual plaintiff's claims are mooted, or if that individual is otherwise unable 
to prosecute an enforcement action. But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit 
nonparties to enforce a decree as long as they can show that it was made in their favor. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 71 ("When an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the 
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There is, nevertheless, an intractable practical problem with 
the use of the individual action for broad injunctive relief. The 
court may choose to enter an injunction only for the individual 
plaintiff and refuse to enter a broad decree against all enforce-
ment of the challenged policy. Although the plaintiff may well 
argue that such a decision is a confusion of rights and reme-
dies,46 the individual plaintiff is no longer personally likely to 
benefit from the relief and thus would find it difficult to with-
stand a motion to dismiss on appeal. 47 
A final disincentive to reliance on stare decisis, offensive col-
lateral estoppel, or an individual action for a broad injunction 
pertains to mootness. Mootness law has developed in a peculiar 
way in recent years, and the rule has emerged that, in class ac-
tions, and only in class actions, the case will not be moot al-
though claims of the parties actually in court are moot and not 
capable of repetition with respect to those parties.48 The rule ap-
plies as long as the mootness occurred after class certification 
and the claims of unnamed class members are still alive. 49 More-
over, if class certification is denied, that order may be appealed, 
action, that person may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party 
.... "). No special relation to the plaintiff need be shown. See Ennels v. Alabama Inns 
Assocs., 581 F. Supp. 708, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (desegregation case brought as class ac-
tion, but apparently no certification; order forbidding discrimination nevertheless en-
forceable by any black person pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 71); United States v. Hackett, 
123 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Woods v. O'Brien, 78 F. Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1948). 
Of course, enforcement is facilitated if a finding is made by the court in the individual 
case that the injunction has in fact been made in the favor of the entire group of persons 
threatened by the policy attacked in the suit. Cases in which uncertified class actions 
were settled by consent decrees which set out the class of beneficiaries who would subse-
quently be able to enforce include Alford v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., No. 83 
C 9301 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1984) (consent decree); and John A. v. Gill, No. 81-C-2456 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1983) (consent decree). 
46. Courts may actually confuse rights and remedies. Gregory v. Litton Sys., 472 F.2d 
631, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1972); see Note, Certifying Classes and Subclasses in Title VII 
Suits, 99 HARV. L. REV. 619, 629 (1986). 
47. See supra note 45. An argument might be made that the status of the individual 
seeking the relief that has been denied for others is no different from that of the named 
plaintiff in a class action appealing the denial of certification despite the fact that the 
named plaintiff's individual claim has become moot. See generally United States Parole 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (finding no mootness in appeal of denial of 
class certification despite mootness of class representative's claim). The Supreme Court, 
however, appears reluctant to extend Geraghty irrespective of good policy reasons to do 
so. See infra note 50. A plaintiff would hardly stake major litigation on such a chance. 
48. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 
U.S. 393, 399-402 (1975). See generally Note, Class Standing and the Class Representa-
tive, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1647-52 (1981) (discussing possible justifications for this 
rule). 
49. Some courts extend the rule to situations where mootness occurred while the mo-
tion for class certification was pending, and the defendant appeared to be trying to moot 
the controversy. E.g., DeBrown v. Trainor, 598 F.2d 1069, 1071 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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and, if reversed, class certification will be entered nunc pro tune, 
despite the fact that the claims of the parties actually before the 
court have become moot after the denial of class certification.50 
This risk of mootness in a case that is not a class action may 
not be quite as great as it appears, for even an individual case 
will not be moot if the mooting of the plaintiff's claims occurred 
because of voluntary cessation of the challenged activity, where 
the individual plaintiff would stand to be harmed if the activity 
were resumed.111 The case, furthermore, is not moot even if it is 
not certified as a class action, if the conduct complained of is 
such that it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," so 
long as the individual plaintiff is in the position of being a vic-
tim of the conduct again.112 But in the absence of one of these 
factors, mootness of the individual plaintiff's claim will end the 
case, assuming that no other person is able or willing to substi-
tute in for the plaintiff. The burden of substitution may not be 
difficult in some cases,53 but in cases where individuals may fear 
reprisal for coming forward to sue, or where they are largely un-
aware of their rights, or where the group of persons sought to be 
benefited is scattered throughout the country, the burden of 
substitution will be difficult.114 An obstinate defendant can in-
crease the probability of these problems by delaying the case or 
filing frivolous appeals.1111 • 
Thus, a plethora of legal rules and predictable strategies based 
on them leaves the class action as the preferred means to en-
force claims that statutes and administrative policies violate su-
50. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338. The Supreme Court expressly refused to apply this prin-
ciple to nonclass action law reform litigation. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 
431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977); Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 
(1975). 
51. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953). 
52. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). For discussion and 
additional authorities on this exception and that of voluntary cessation of illegal activity, 
see Wilton, supra note 31, at 629-33. 
53. E.g., Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1125 
(1981); Nichols v. Schubert, 71 F.R.D. 578 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
54. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 14, 199 (1976) (discussing reluctance of civil 
rights plaintiffs to file school desegregation cases because of fear of retaliation). Addi-
tional examples include transitory claims not capable of repetition with regard to the 
same person and claims of severely mentally ill persons or persons otherwise unlikely to 
realize their own interest in coming forward. See Christy v. Hammel, 87 F.R.D. 381, 393 
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (permitting class action where class representative had mooted claim in 
a case relating to transitory incarceration of prisoners in state mental hospital). 
55. See Kamp, supra note 31, at 375 (discussing mootness rules and other strategic 
advantages of class action procedure). 
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pervening law,116 at least in the antipoverty and civil rights fields 
in which class action litigation has boomed in the past twenty 
years. 
2. Institutional cases- The second category of class action 
cases under subdivision (b)(2) is the institutional case, where the 
plaintiffs challenge a pervasive set of conditions affecting J1 per-
sons who are residents of or served by an institution. Examples 
include cases challenging conditions of confinement in prisons117 
or mental hospitals.118 The relief sought typically would be the 
elimination of a variety of systemic practices, or, in some cases, 
the court-supervised abolition of the institution and its replace-
56. To the extent that a class action provides a surer and more efficient mechanism 
for achieving relief when all that is desired is a prospective change, the class action is 
certain to be preferred when what is desired includes retroactive monetary relief as well. 
Even where a governmental body might observe precedent and change its policy for the 
future for everyone because of a result in an individual action, it may still be reluctant to 
compensate all those affected by the previous policy unless a court forces it to do so. The 
immunity cases cited supra notes 35, 37-38, demonstrate this fact. No voluntary pay-
ments have been forthcoming. Individual follow-up actions will be no easier than they 
would be in a plain public policy case. Mootness problems may be less important than in 
an ordinary public policy case because the individual plaintiff's claim for monetary relief 
might furnish a basis to keep the case alive despite a prospective change in governmental 
conduct. But if the government wants to moot the case, it can still relieve the individual 
from the effect of the policy, pay the individual's damages, and be free of the risk of a 
large judgment. Cf. DeBrown v. Trainor, 598 F.2d 1069, 1070 (7th Cir. 1979) (argument 
by defendants that case was moot because they paid class representatives' claims for 
public benefits two days after representatives filed class certification motion). What is 
needed is a court order that gives monetary or other retroactive relief to every person 
affected by the policy, ideally an order enforceable on any individual's application if the 
defendant does not fully comply, because the individual bringing the suit may lack the 
resources to continue to enforce the judgment after winning the case. In a class action, 
any class member may petition for contempt sanctions if the defendant disobeys the 
order. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (contempt proceeding in class action), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 
706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983). Nonparties, however, for whose 
benefit a decree is obtained in a case that is not a class action, may enforce the decree 
without the participation of the plaintiff in the case under FED. R. C1v. P. 71. See supra 
note 45. 
57. E.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
58. E.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). School 
desegregation cases also fit into this category because they challenge a wide range of 
intertwined resource allocation decisions of a complex social institution. E.g., Milliken v. 
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1, 7-8, 33 (1971); see Chayes, supra note 26, at 1298-99 n.80 (citing mental health, 
reapportionment, desegregation, and other cases as examples of similar types of complex 
litigation). An employment discrimination case that attacks a broad range of employer 
practices may also be institutional litigation of the type discussed here. The claims may 
be numerous and cover large numbers of different categories of persons. Relief may in-
clude drastic changes in work settings, hiring, discipline, promotion, and discharge proce-
dures. See, e.g., Russel v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). 
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ment with alternative arrangements.119 These lawsuits are pre-
mised on the claim that existing arrangements violate constitu-
tional or statutory requirements. Usually, the claim is that the 
lawlessness is pervasive in the institution. In Wyatt u. 
Stickney,60 one of the first cases challenging the overall condi-
tions at a state mental institution, the plaintiffs contended that 
a whole range of operating conditions, procedures, and settings 
violated their rights to personal safety, education, and treatment 
of mental and physical illness. The plaintiffs in a case like Wy-
att may seek a detailed injunctive decree covering all the chal-
lenged practices, or they may request that the court forbid the 
continued operation of the institution and order the creation of 
other means of accomplishing the social objective that the insti-
tution is designed to serve.61 Alternatively, the court could order 
the institution closed unless the defendants "voluntarily" make 
an extensive number of changes in it.62 
There is some cause to be skeptical of the need for class action 
procedures for this type of case. Any person affected by illegal 
conduct pervading an institution's practices should be able to 
sue individually and obtain an injunction forbidding the con-
duct. If the injunction entails reforming the entire institution, 
the individual plaintiff is entitled to precisely that remedy.63 
Even if individual relief might satisfy the plaintiff's claim, it 
would be economically impractical to create a special remedy 
just for the single victorious plaintiff. It makes no sense for the 
governmental defendant to build a state-of-the-art mental hos-
pital for a single patient. This contrasts with a public policy 
case, where exceptions can be made economically to satisfy a re-
medial order in an individual action. For example, it is not diffi-
cult to continue to keep the one victorious Social Security claim-
ant on the program while other persons · similarly situated 
59. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 7-8. 
60. 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. 
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. 
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
61. In a similar case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 
1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en 
bane), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), rev'd, 
465 U.S. 89 (1984), the plaintiffs, a class of persons at a state facility for the mentally 
retarded, requested that the institution be closed and that services be provided them in 
local communities. 
62. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 165 (2d 
Cir. 1980) ("In the face of constitutional violations at a state institution, a federal court 
can order the state either to take the steps necessary to rectify the violations or to close 
the institution."). 
63. Rhode, supra note 45, at 1195-96; see cases cited supra note 45. 
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remain cut off.64 Retaining only one claimant is cheaper than ex-
tending benefits to an entire class. 
Nevertheless, procedural considerations still compel litigants 
interested in institutional reform to proceed by class action. The 
first problem with an individual action is that the case will be-
come moot if the plaintiff is discharged from the institution or 
otherwise cannot carry on the litigation.65 A second problem is 
enforcement of the judgment if, for similar reasons, the plaintiff 
is not able to initiate contempt proceedings.66 One should not 
underestimate the willingness of governments charged with in-
stitutional wrongdoing to create arrangements that moot indi-
vidual plaintiffs or satisfy judgments in their favor without 
changing institutions. In order to avoid desegregating public uni-
versities, southern states established programs that offered to 
pay tuition at northern institutions for the few blacks who ap-
plied to the southern schools and threatened to sue unless ad-
mitted.67 One can imagine a state paying for private treatment 
of those few residents of the state mental institution who are 
willing to file suit to challenge the conditions to which they are 
subjected. 
Beyond these procedural difficulties, however, lies a more fun-
damental problem with reliance on individual adjudications in 
institutional cases. The problem has to do with the nature of 
public institutions, both physical and social. There are two as-
pects to the problem: the variety of remedial options, and the 
variety of affected individuals. 
Among the things that characterize cases challenging institu-
tions is the wide range of items that a court might include in a 
remedial order entered after a finding of liability.68 With an in-
dividual action, difficulties would arise if, after an extensive re-
medial order is entered at the behest of an individual plaintiff in 
one case, another plaintiff files an action. Typically, none of the 
feasible solutions will totally eliminate the unlawful conditions 
that led to the case, at least in the near future.69 Citing the lin-
64. See cases cited supra note 33 (examples of nonacquiescence refusal). 
65. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
66. But see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of an 
individual injunctive decree enforceable by a class of persons under Rule 71). 
67. R. KLUGER, supra note 54, at 189, 202; see Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.S. 337 (1938); Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). 
68. Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. 
REv. 428, 428-29 (1977); see Chayes, supra note 26, at 1298-1302. 
69. See, e.g., Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the 
Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 257-58 (1977) ("The question is ... 
what degree of integration can be achieved at a cost which does not permanently cripple 
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gering effects of past unlawful activity despite the implementa-
tion of relief, the individual plaintiff might demand a different 
remedial option that would be perceived as better. 
This problem is both more severe in its effects and more likely 
to occur in institutional cases than in public policy cases. In 
public policy cases, the remedial options are far fewer. If the 
purpose of the case is to stop a governmental policy or practice, 
a simple prohibitory injunction might well suffice. If it does not, 
there exists a well-worn path of contempt remedies to enforce 
the original injunction. Although more choices are present when 
additional monetary or other retrospective relief is requested, 
even then accepting the benefit might well be taken as con-
senting to the entirety of the arrangement, thereby foreclosing 
the right to file suit for additional relief.70 In an institutional 
setting, however, acceptance of the court-ordered change is to-
tally nonconsensual. Things have changed, and there is nothing 
the affected person can do, except possibly file a new action to 
achieve a different set of changes.71 Moreover, in a public policy 
case seeking retrospective relief in addition to a prospective in-
junction, a remedy for a dissatisfied person typically is additive. 
If the person is dissatisfied with the terms of the retrospective 
relief given and successfully sues for more, the person either will 
get more money or get the right to challenge a determination for 
several years before the year for which others might obtain such 
a right. Implementation of this kind of relief, even for a large 
number of subsequent plaintiffs, does not entail the sort of dis-
ruption and expense entailed in reworking an already opera-
tional plan to reform an institution. But the choice of one or 
another remedial option in an institutional case is not one to 
make lightly. Changes in a mental hospital, prison, school sys-
tem, or other institution cost money and effort that might other-
wise benefit the people whom the lawsuit was supposed to help. 
Problems also arise from the fact that within the group of 
people who might be affected by relief in an institutional case 
are the institution's clients or participants, any number of whom 
might be potential plaintiffs. Just as there is a wide variety of 
other educational programs and in a manner which avoids the sort of terrorism that has 
become synonymous with Pontiac and South Boston in recent years."). 
70. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) ("[W]here the EEOC has 
prevailed in its [nonclass, 'pattern or practice'] action, the court may reasonably require 
any individual who claims under its judgment to relinquish his right to bring a separate 
private action."). 
71. See generally Kamp, supra note 31, at 393-94 (explaining absence of opt-out 
right in subdivision (b)(l) and (b)(2) actions on this ground). 
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relief that any plaintiff could choose to seek, there are likely to 
be wide differences of interests within the group of potential 
plaintiffs. These differences might motivate members of the 
group to pursue different interests. The problem has become 
commonplace in class action litigation over school desegregation 
and mental institution conditions. Splits develop within and be-
tween minority organizations over the amount of bus transporta-
tion necessary to desegregate a school system. 72 Some groups of 
mental patients prefer greater degrees of reform of existing facil-
ities, while others press for greater deinstitutionalization.73 In 
employment discrimination cases seeking structural change in 
the workplace, the interests of rejected minority applicants and 
existing minority employees may diverge.74 There is also a possi-
bility of conflict among the various disfavored groups (women, 
blacks, Hispanics) who might all have experienced discrimina-
tion. 711 This divergence of interest, coupled with the wide range 
of conflicting remedial options, creates a specter of an unending 
series of suits and conflicting judicial decrees. 
A class action under Rule 23(b)(2) avoids these problems. In a 
class action, the court can define the class broadly to include all 
potential plaintiffs who have the right to file individual actions. 
Many courts ha_ve approved the inclusion of persons who might 
have such a right in the future. 76 Because the final judgment in 
such a suit precludes the claims of all members of the class by 
the operation of res judicata, the risk of conflicting decrees in 
subsequent cases is eliminated. Courts are extremely reluctant 
to find judgments in class actions subject to later attack by class 
members, at least in the absence of inadequate representation 
by the named plaintiffs,77 and courts do not find inadequacy if 
72. Chayes, supra note 26, at 1296 n.71 (discussing Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of 
Educ., 298 F. Supp. 208 (D. Conn. 1968), a{f'd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
73. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109 (3d Cir. 
1979) (en bane) (noting that groups within the class disagreed about the appropriate 
relief, with some members wanting Pennhurst closed and others wanting it to stay open 
but with improved conditions), reu'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Rhode, supra note 45, at 1260 
n.290. 
74. Rutherglen, supra note 45, at 50-51; Note, supra note 46, at 632; see General Tel. 
Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158-60 (1982). 
75. See Martinez v. Bechtel Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 898, 904 (N.D. 
Cal. 1975). 
76. E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); see Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) 
Class Actions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1985) (criticizing this practice). 
77. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1988); Williams v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 832 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 
(1988). 
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there is a simple conflict in preferences between the representa-
tive and the disgruntled class member.78 Where members of the 
class have discrete interests, and the likelihood of dissatisfaction 
with the remedy is therefore high, the court can certify sub-
classes with different named plaintiffs, and then either formu-
late a remedy based on their competing interests or encourage 
them to propose their own compromise plan.79 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A THEORY OF DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTION OF INTANGIBLE INTERESTS 
Among the important results of the explosion of civil rights 
cases in the 1960's and 1970's, many of which were Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions, was the emergence of a theory of due process pro-
tection of intangible interests. The now familiar pattern of deci-
sion in such cases is that the court first questions whether the 
interest that the plaintiff seeks to protect is a property or liberty 
interest that arises out of state law, the federal constitution, or 
some other source. If such an interest exists, due process protec-
tions apply. The court then considers whether any protections 
afforded by the challenged scheme are satisfactory to protect the · 
interest. 
Critical in the development of this theory was the recognition 
that protected interests exist in such things as welfare benefits 
and public employment. This "new property" need not be visi-
ble, eternal, or transferable. By the 1960's, new property had be-
come, for much of the population, a source of livelihood and se-
curity comparable to that provided by land in the eighteenth 
century. 80 The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, gradually rec-
ognized that it deserved due process protection. 
The extension of due process protection to interests other 
than traditional ones, such as tangible property and freedom 
from physical constraint, began with Goldberg v. Kelly, decided 
78. See, e.g., Kincade v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that opposition to a settlement by several named plaintiffs did not prevent its 
entry). 
79. See Hawkins v. Fulton County, 95 F.R.D. 88, 94 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Note, supra 
note 46, at 635-39; see also Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 318 
(7th Cir. 1980) (considering desirable settlements in civil rights cases where voluntary 
cooperation with relief would otherwise be difficult to achieve); Anderson, The Approval 
and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 579, 598. 
80. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 738-39 (1964). 
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in 1970.81 The Court in Goldberg found a protected interest in 
the continued receipt of welfare benefits. It held that due pro-
cess required opportunity for oral hearing before termination. In 
rapid succession, the Court found protected interests in a right 
to obtain a divorce,82 continued possession of a driver's license,83 
public employment in which some form of implied tenure ex-
isted,84 a debtor's right to possession of household goods held 
subject to a chattel mortgage,811 and the right to attend public 
school when threatened with a suspension of ten days' dura-
tion.86 Faced with the argument that government, in granting 
the intangible property in which a protected interest exists, can 
limit the procedures that may be imposed to protect it, a major-
ity of the Court ruled otherwise. It held that the questions of 
protected interest and degree of protection required are sepa-
rate. The government cannot take away life, liberty, or property 
without due process, and the question of what process is due is 
an independent question of federal constitutional law.87 
The expansion of protected interests proceeded somewhat un-
steadily. Interests in personal reputation gave the Court diffi-
culty. In 1971, it found a protected reputation interest in a case 
challenging governmental promulgation of a list of drunkards,88 
but in 1976, it found no protected interest in a case challenging 
81. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 567 (11th ed. 1985). Goldberg did not spring on the scene without warning. In his 
concurrence to Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, Justice Frankfurter said that due 
process protected an organization's good name and ability to function free of being 
branded communist. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 886, 894, 896-98 (1961), suggested that a protected interest existed in employ-
ment at a government facility, but the Court ruled that this interest would not prevent 
dismissal for security reasons without a hearing or full statement of reasons in military 
or sensitive employment. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), found 
a protected property interest in the continued use of a stream of wages subject to pre-
judgment garnishment. But none of these cases stated the issue as clearly or explained 
the decision as fully as Goldberg v. Kelly. Regarding causes of action not yet filed in 
court, a form of intangible property recognized as protected by due process even earlier, 
see infra text accompanying notes 110-14. 
82. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
83. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
84. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564 (1972) (finding no property interest in renewal of contract for clearly untenured 
public academic employment). 
85. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
86. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
87. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). But see id. 
at 151-58 (plurality opinion); id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he plurality would 
thus conclude that the statute ... determines not only the nature of appellee's property 
interest, but also the extent of the procedural protections .... "). 
88. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
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promulgation of a list of shoplifters.89 Social Security benefits 
appeared not to be protected in light of a 1975 decision,90 but 
the Court held a year later that they were protected, at least in 
the context of a cutoff of previously approved eligibility.91 
Transfers among prisons for nonpunitive reasons were held not 
to infringe protected interests, even if they caused significantly 
diminished freedom of activity.92 
Nevertheless, with the limits and, at least with respect to 
reputational interests, the retrenchment that the Court imposed, 
the broad extension of due process to intangible interests is now 
an accomplished fact. Recent cases recognize protected interests 
in the right to continued service from a municipally-owned util-
ity,93 the right to remain in the general prison population rather 
than be transferred to a mental hospital,94 and the right to con-
tinued possession of a horse trainer's license.911 All of these hold-
ings are part of the continuing development of the due process 
theory that first took shape in the 197O's. 
89. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The distinction appeared to hinge on the idea 
that the accused drunkards would be forbidden from purchasing liquor, while the shop-
lifters would not be forbidden from making purchases in stores. According to the court, 
liberty was not infringed upon in the latter case. Id. at 708-09. 
90. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768 (1975) (failing to apply a due process test 
to a denial of benefits). 
91. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (applying a due process test to 
termination of benefits). 
92. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 
U.S. 238 (1983) (finding no protected interest infringed by transfer from Hawaii to main-
land). But see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (finding protected interest against 
transfer to administrative segregation, but due process satisfied by existing procedures). 
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-10, at 698 (2d ed. 1988) 
(describing the Court's retreat from earlier cases as one in which the Court demands an 
explicit entitlement, rather than an implicit understanding, to find a protected interest). 
Note also that the Court recently imposed limits on the reach of due process by hold-
ing that merely negligent destruction of a protected interest does not constitute a "depri-
vation" sufficient to violate the due process clause. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
328 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). These cases, however, do not 
weaken the basic proposition that intangible interests are protected by the due process 
clause. Additionally, they do not overrule or question the holding of Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982), that the operation of a rule or statute can effect 
a deprivation sufficient to violate the due process clause. See infra notes 114-19 and 
accompanying text. 
93. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 
94. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
95. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). 
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Ill. CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE FRAMERS 
OF SUBDIVISION (b)(2) AND THE PRACTICE AND DOCTRINAL 
DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1966 TO THE PRESENT 
The framers of Rule 23(b)(2) did not predict the explosion in 
civil rights and antipoverty litigation that occurred in the late 
196O's, and they could not anticipate the role that the Rule 
would play in it. The Advisory Committee Note and Benjamin 
Kaplan's 1967 article explaining the Advisory Committee's in-
tentions in the 1966 revisions treat subdivision (b)(2) almost as 
an afterthought.96 The Committee focused instead on the aboli-
tion of the existing terminology for the categories of class ac-
tions, the imposition of the principle that class actions should 
bind the class, and the technicalities of subdivision (b)(3).97 
Nevertheless, subdivision (b)(2) serves admirably in civil 
rights and antipoverty cases because it defeats formal or infor-
mal governmental nonacquiescence. It is safe to say, however, 
that the framers of Rule 23(b)(2) had no conception of the prob-
lem of governmental nonacquiescence when they drafted the 
Rule. They were working in an era in which a highly respected 
authority had recently written that class actions were likely not 
to be superior vehicles to individual test cases for law reform 
because defendants would voluntarily apply the effects of the 
cases universally.98 Even after the adoption of Rule 23(b)(2), 
respected judges denied class action status to cases against gov-
ernment defendants on the ground that government officials 
would certainly apply the result of any individual case to every-
96. See Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 102; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. 
REv. 356, 389 (1967) (discussing briefly subdivision (b)(2) and emphasizing terminology, 
preclusion, and subdivision (b)(3)); see also Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966) (emphasizing subdivision (b)(3)). 
97. Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 98-106; Cohn, supra note 96, at 1213-26; Kaplan, 
supra note 96, at 375-400. These features of the amendments were the ones that had 
drawn criticism at the time of their adoption. See Committee on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 76-
77, 80-82, 91 (1965). 
98. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 433, 446 (1960) (cited in Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 103). This idea survived 
long after 1966. See, e.g., Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Inter-
est, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1118 (1980) ("We would not 
accept the spectacle of the government acting as a private litigant, wringing advantage 
from a concededly unlawful course of activity until other plaintiffs, using the principles 
laid down in the first case, sought judicial relief."). 
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one in the individual's position.99 Although examples existed of 
National Labor Relations Board and Internal Revenue Service 
nonacquiescence,100 no one seems to have anticipated that non-
acquiescence might be adopted more widely, and that this would 
require plaintiffs to proceed by class action. 
Of course, the various factors that make nonacquiescence so 
tempting today were not all present in 1966.101 Significantly, the 
main example that the Advisory Committee gave for the use of 
the Rule 23(b)(2) class action was desegregation litigation. In 
these cases, many government and private defendants forcibly 
resisted the courts' decrees. 102 Thus, the Committee may have 
implicitly recognized the utility of a binding, easily enforced, 
classwide decree when defendants have a mind to resist. 
Mootness law also induces plaintiffs to use class actions rather 
than individual litigation.103 The Supreme Court did not fully 
articulate the exceptions to mootness doctrine for class actio_ns 
until 1980, 10" and there is no mention of mootness doctrine in 
the discussions surrounding the adoption of subdivision (b)(2) in 
1966. 
An additional matter that is clear from examining materials 
from the period in which Rule 23(b)(2) was adopted is that the 
framers felt that one-way preclusion was unfair in not exposing 
both sides of the case to mutuality of risk of a binding negative 
judgment. That was the reason the new Rule required that all 
99. E.g., Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); see Note, The "Need Requirement": A Barrier to Class 
Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2), 67 GEO. L.J. 1211, 1220 (1979) (collecting cases). 
100. See supra note 33. 
101. Decisions in pre-1974 welfare benefits cases either ignored or overruled objec-
tions to monetary relief based on eleventh amendment immunity. E.g., Jordan v. 
Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 n.5 (D. Conn. 1967), aff'd, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969). See generally supra note 29 (discussing eleventh amendment immunity). 
The Supreme Court, furthermore, had not fully developed the doctrine of good faith 
immunity, a fact that made disregard of any standing precedent a hazard. See Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 (1975) (collecting cases) ("The nature of immunity from 
awards of damages . . . is not a question which the lower federal courts have answered 
with a single voice."). 
102. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 
U.S. 972 (1964) (cited in Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 102); see also R. KLUGER, supra 
note 54, at 753-54 (1976) (discussing resistance to desegregation). 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55. 
104. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 338 (1980); Deposit Guar. 
Nat'! Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 397-403 (1975), 
ruled that a class action exception existed but left it undefined. In a separate opinion, 
Justice White argued that the prevailing view among the circuits recognized no such 
exception. Id. at 413 n.1. See generally supra text accompanying notes 48-55 (discussing 
mootness in relation to the need for class actions). 
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class members be bound by the result in the case, whether 
favorable to them or not. But the Committee limited its ap-
proach to the point of fairness. It did not consider the functional 
benefit that preclusion confers in institutional litigation-the 
protection of decrees providing one form of relief from chal-
lenges to institutional arrangements that demand conflicting in-
stitutional changes. Desegregation cases were the only institu-
tional litigation on the Committee's mind; there is no indication 
that the Committee had any concern with differences in the 
types of relief that might be sought by different groups of plain-
tiffs in these cases. 10~ 
Just as there is no reason that the framers would have antici-
pated any of the subsequent developments in litigation or in le-
gal doctrine, there is no reason that the framers of the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23 would have anticipated the post-1966 
development of due process theory. Charles Reich's seminal arti-
cle on the subject did not even appear until 1964;106 there was no 
sure way of knowing at the time that the Court would find its 
theory persuasive and apply it to due process cases. Goldberg v. 
Kelly,107 decided six years later, was the first Supreme Court 
case to adopt Reich's theory. 
If the framers had known how due process theory would de-
velop, they probably would not have drafted Rule 23(b)(2) as 
they did.108 The most consistent strain of class action theory 
105. See Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 98-107. 
106. Reich, supra note 80. 
107. 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). 
108. This is not to say that the framers necessarily had the distinction between tangi-
ble and intangible interests in mind when they provided for the due process protection 
of notice only in cases for monetary relief. Given the paucity of the materials relating 
specifically to subdivision (b)(2), the framers may have conceded the presence of inter-
ests protected by due process in subdivision (b)(2) cases but would have argued that the 
classes in these cases have greater cohesion and homogeneity, thus making safeguards 
other than notice adequate to satisfy due process. They may have viewed notice as too 
costly or impossible in subdivision (b)(2) cases. 
The Advisory Committee's use of an action for specific relief for victims of consumer 
fraud as one of the hypothetical applications of subdivision (b)(2) supports this interpre-
tation of the framers' view of notice. Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 102. Even before 
the "new property" cases, no one would have distinguished such a case from a case for 
cash damages with respect to the applicability of due process protection. Further support 
lies in the fact that the Advisory Committee mounted such an extensive defense of sub-
division (b)(3) against the anticipated argument that classes in such cases lacked ade-
quate homogeneity to satisfy traditional class action standards. Id. at 102-04. Neverthe-
less, it seems anachronistic to attribute to the Advisory Committee a detailed multiple-
step due process analysis with respect to subdivision (b)(2) in light of the fact that the 
Committee appears not to have given the subdivision very much thought altogether and 
that it had every justification to be satisfied with the assumption that due process pro-
tections did not apply. 
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contends that each member of the class has an individual cause 
of action and must have one in order to be included in the 
class.109 A class action precludes this individual cause of action, 
preventing the individual involved from ever asserting the cause 
of action on his own. 
The apparent due process problem with the 1966 Rule is that 
this binding res judicata effect extinguishes the class member's 
cause of action, yet there is no assurance that the class member 
will ever have heard about the action, much less have had influ-
ence over its litigation. 
IV. THE RULE 23(b)(2) AND DUE PROCESS 
To answer the question whether the apparent due process 
problem is real, it is necessary to apply the pattern of decision 
employed in due process cases. First, the court must determine 
whether an individual class member has a protected interest in 
injunctive or declaratory relief. Second, the court must evaluate 
the existing protection of that interest to determine if the pro-
tection is adequate. 
A. The Applicability of Due Process Protection 
It can be argued that there is no individual property right in a 
cause of action, at least not in a cause of action for injunctive or 
declaratory relief that the possessor has not personally filed in 
court. But as early as 1950, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. 110 foreshadowed the demise of this idea. Mullane held 
that due process protected the interest of beneficiaries of com-
mon trust fund accounts in a periodic action by a nominee of the 
109. E.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975) (requiring each class member 
to meet jurisdictional prerequisites); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 
(1973) (requiring each class member's claim to meet jurisdictional amount); see Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 803 (1985) (referring to each class member as a 
"plaintiff"). But see Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 
1983 SuP. CT. REV. 459, 503 (arguing that the Supreme Court has frequently not followed 
such a "joinder" model). 
110. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Forerunners of Mullane include Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 
32, 42-43 (1940) (applying due process considerations to interests of absentees in class 
action); Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933) (holding that vested cause of 
action is protected by due process); and Hassall v. Wilcox, 130 U.S. 493, 504 (1889) 
(holding that lien cannot be subordinated in judicial proceeding without at least con-
structive notice). 
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bank to settle all claims for improper management of the fund. 
The value of suits such as Mullane lies in their preclusion, by 
res judicata, of all potential claims over the accounts. 
The analogy to the individual claims of members of a class 
could not be much clearer; the only possible distinction is that 
subdivision (b)(2) class members have claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief rather than monetary relief. m The usefulness 
of the distinction for due process theory could hardly survive the 
"new property" revolution.112 In 1971, in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 113 the Supreme Court extended due process protection to 
111. This distinction might have been critical to the framers of the 1966 amendment 
to Rule 23. They established that in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, those for monetary re-
lief, class judgments could have preclusive effect only when all class members had been 
notified in the "reasonable" manner that Mullane demanded. This notification would 
take place at the time of class certification and would be accompanied by the right to opt 
out of the class action and the preclusive effect of its judgment. No such protection, 
however, was afforded subdivision (b)(2) class members. 
112. Some commentators have located the origin of the distinction in the traditional 
division between law and equity, a basis that became anachronistic after the merger of 
law and equity by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. See, e.g., Kamp, supra 
note 31, at 390. This analysis leaves open the question of why the drafters chose notice 
for law (damages), but not for equity (injunctions). It also fails to deal with the anomaly 
of the declaratory judgment, which seems to count as law, but for which there is no 
notice. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504, 509 (1959). 
The first question may have an answer in the fact that the class action began as an 
equity device only, and generally lacked notice, while Mullane might have compared 
more closely to a proceeding at law. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950) 
(suggesting that class actions have their origins in equity). But the Mullane proceeding, 
though statutory, was really more an equity action. It had to do with a trustee's equita-
ble duty to the trust. In relief sought, it might be compared to an equitable bill of peace. 
If Mullane is compared to a declaratory judgment action, the provisions of Rule 23(b)(2) 
are even more of a mystery. This all suggests that the law/equity distinction played little 
role in the formulation of the 1966 Rule. 
113. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court appeared to limit Boddie two years later in 
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding $60 fee for bankruptcy filing), and 
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding $25 fee for filing case in 
appellate court for review of welfare reduction). The rationale for Kras is not entirely 
clear. It might be read as holding that due process did not apply because other, 
noncourt-oriented means existed to adjust the plaintiff's state of indebtedness, or it 
might be read to mean that the fee, because it was payable in installments, merely re-
stricted, and did not deprive, the plaintiff of a protected interest. Alternatively, it might 
be read as conceding that a protected interest was being taken away but holding that a 
reasonable fee payable in low installments did not violate due process. Ortwein v. 
Schwab skirted the issue by admitting that the underlying interest in welfare payments 
was protected but holding that the administrative hearings that had already been given 
satisfied due process. Later cases considering fees that prevented poor litigants from pur-
suing legal rights openly acknowledged that protected interests were at stake and that 
the due process clause was applicable. When the costs were upheld, it was on the basis 
that they were reasonable enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. Compare 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding appointment of free 
counsel at parental status termination hearing not required by due process) with Little v. 
Streator, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (finding waiver of fee for blood test in paternity case defense 
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the right of indigent persons to file divorce proceedings, holding 
that a filing fee that prevented the filing of the action violated 
due process. Eleven years later, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 
Co., 114 the Court held directly that a state-created cause of ac-
tion for injunctive relief was property protected by the due pro-
cess clause. The cause of action in that case was an administra-
tive claim for employment discrimination. The Court held that 
the cause of action could not constitutionally be terminated as a 
result of an inadvertent failure of a state agency to schedule a 
conference on time. The monetary nature of the claim was not 
an issue at all in Logan; indeed the cause of action was for rein-
statement to a job and various other equitable relief in addition 
to back pay. The fact that this relief was injunctive was a key 
part of the Court's analysis of the deficiency, for purposes of the 
protections due process affords, of a post-termination tort rem-
edy against the negligent state officer. Moreover, in Logan, as in 
Boddie and Mullane, the claim had not actually been filed as a 
lawsuit. It was still merely an administrative charge; no formal 
complaint had yet issued. As in Boddie and Mullane, the viola-
tion of due process was the failure to permit suit. 
The definition of property that the Logan court used em-
braces a class member's individual cause of action for non-mone-
tary relief. The Court said, "The hallmark of property ... is an 
individual entitlement . . . which cannot be removed except 
'for-cause.' "1111 The claim of any absent class member is a for-
cause entitlement to a form of useful relief. If the person who is 
a class member had instead brought it before a court as an indi-
vidual case, the court could dismiss it only for cause, either on 
its merits or because of some procedural failing properly charged 
to the filing party. The only way in which the claim can other-
required by due process). It appears, from Lassiter, Streator, and particularly Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), that Boddie continues to extend due process 
protection beyond the narrow context of divorce proceedings to all untiled causes of ac-
tion. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 n.5 (discussing Boddie and Kras and concluding that, 
"while the right to seek a divorce may not be a property interest in the same sense as a 
tort or discrimination action, the theories of the cases are not very different"); see also 
id. at 437 (referring to filing fees as "reasonable procedural requirements"). 
114. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
115. Id. at 430. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), involving the validity of a 
state court class decree, the Court never questioned the applicability of due process pro-
tection to the interests of absent class members in a class action to enforce a racially 
restrictive covenant. The Court held that the decree in the class action could not be 
enforced because the interests of the class representatives conflicted with those of some 
class members, thus vitiating the representative's adequacy and violating the due process 
rights of class members who opposed the decree. 
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wise be extinguished is in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action judgment 
against the class. 
The fact that the representative's claim might lose does not 
contradict the existence of a property interest in the claims of 
the absent class members that go down with it. In Mullane, the 
whole purpose of the procedure was for the representative to 
lose and thereby foreclose through res judicata any future cases 
charging impropriety in the fund's management.116 Any individ-
ual case might win, however, by bringing up arguments or evi-
dence that the representative failed to put forward. Varying re-
sults in different jurisdictions on similar claims highlight the 
fact that litigative choices do matter: if absent class members 
had the chance to bring the case over again, they might win. 117 
Moreover, what the Court continually stressed in Logan was 
not the likelihood of the ultimate success of the individual's 
116. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1950). 
117. This situation seems to be the converse of nonacquiescence: plaintiffs, instead of 
defendants, hope for better results in a subsequent case. An illustration of a class action 
binding the class to an erroneous, losing result is Dixon v. Quern, 537 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982). Dixon challenged a welfare department policy of terminating assistance under 
a state program for the disabled whenever a recipient of the program was found not 
disabled and denied eligibility under the federal Supplemental Security Income program. 
The court allowed the terminations and granted partial summary judgment to the wel-
fare department. Id. at 989. Subsequently, a number of persons brought individual ac-
tions in state court challenging the termination of the assistance with respect to them-
selves, arguing only that the termination violated a state statutory provision. This 
provision had been brought before the court in Dixon, but the new plaintiffs contended 
that it had not been properly construed. The state courts ruled in favor of the new indi-
vidual plaintiffs. E.g., Johnson v. Quern, 90 Ill. App. 3d 151, 412 N.E.2d 1082 (1980), 
appeal denied, 83 Ill. 2d 570 (1981). 
In Johnson and other early individual cases, the welfare department failed to raise 
Dixon and argue for the preclusive effect of rulings already entered against the claims of 
the class. In subsequent cases it did, but these cases all involved persons who had been 
terminated from the aid program after the date of the Dixon class certification. Because 
the class definition in Dixon read "all disabled persons whose assistance ... has been 
denied or terminated," the courts ruled that the individual plaintiffs were not in the 
class, and so were not barred. E.g., Macklin v. Miller, No. 82-L-592, slip op. at 1 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. May 27, 1982); Baldwin v. Miller, No. 81-CH-2, slip op. at 2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 14, 
1982). Of course, if the Dixon definition had included future class members, or if the 
courts had construed it to do so, the results in the cases would have been different. The 
fact that individuals freed from a class decision by what looks like a technicality could 
win in a new series of actions in a different forum demonstrates that the initial class 
action result is not the single true result that can be reached in a legal controversy. 
Moreover, the class representatives in Dixon had no interest adverse to the class mem-
bers. They were represented by competent, experienced counsel. Nevertheless, that was 
no protection from a result that would have operated to foreclose the rights of the class 
members to bring claims that would have been successful in a subsequent action. The 
individuals had to face the barrier of stare decisis from the Dixon decision, but they were 
able to overcome it. But for a litigative error by the defendant in the initial cases and 
fortunate timing of events in the others, they would have faced an insuperable res judi-
cata bar. 
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claim, but rather the fact that the claimant had the right to use 
the power of the state to attempt to achieve such success. Due 
process protects this power: "The right to use the [state employ-
ment discrimination statute's] adjudicatory procedures shares 
these characteristics [ of property]. "118 Although only a class 
member with a meritorious claim will suffer actual damage from 
having the claim fall with the class action, due process requires 
that when violations occur, at least some remedy must be given, 
even in cases with no actual damage.119 
Some commentators deflect the due process question by com-
paring Rule 23(b)(2) cases to legislative proceedings.120 Like leg-
islation, the injunctive or declaratory relief awarded operates 
across the board, is often prospective only, and addresses gener-
alized needs, not particular injuries. Thus, the argument goes, 
the class member has rights similar to those of the citizen in the 
legislative process: the right to find out about the proceeding, if 
118. Logan, 455 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). 
119. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978) (assessing nominal damages for 
failure to provide hearing where actual injury was not proven); L. TRIBE, supra note 92, 
§ 10-7, at 666 (labelling this approach an "intrinsic" view of due process). An application 
of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 demonstrates the impor-
tance of this approach. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986), and Davidson v. 
€annon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986), the Court ruled that negligent conduct by a govern-
ment official does not constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or property under the due 
process clause. The Court, however, did nothing to disturb the settled idea that inten-
tional deprivation of the right to a hearing violates due process. Otherwise, no basis 
would remain, after Daniels and Davidson, to attack on due process grounds grossly 
unfair hearing procedures for compensating victims of governmental negligence. Thus, if 
a state had a tort claims act that allowed motorists to sue over negligently caused colli-
sions with state vehicles but provided for payment to the judges based on the number of 
cases they decided in favor of the state, the scheme would violate due process because of 
the intentional deprivation, through established state procedure, of the right to a fair 
hearing. It would not be correct to apply Daniels and Davidson to the case and rule that 
because the deprivation-damage to person or property on the highway-was a result of 
a state agent's negligence in driving, there could be no violation of due process in the 
handling of claims arising from the deprivation. See Bandes, Monell, Parrat, Daniels and 
Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 
low AL. REV. 101, 146 (1986) (discussing established state procedure as a form of intent). 
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Daniels and Davidson, suggested looking to the 
initial destruction of life or property, rather than rejecting the injury as something other 
than a deprivation simply because it resulted from negligence. He asked instead whether 
the state's procedures to compensate for the destruction satisfy due process. He found 
that the existence of a state tort claims remedy satisfied due process in Daniels and that 
the refusal to waive sovereign immunity for prisoner claims did not deny due process of 
law in Davidson. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 340-43 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
120. Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1397 (1976). 
See generally Chayes, supra note 26, at 1297 (discussing legislative effect of group litiga-
tion); Kamp, supra note 31, at 394 n.150 (same); Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social 
Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 866, 890-91 (1977) 
(same). 
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he or she uses the public record, and the right to request to be 
heard, if the participants offer the citizen a hearing. 
The analogy is flawed, however. First, no one has a right to 
legislation. There is no factual showing that, if made, will entitle 
someone to legislative relief. Precisely the opposite is true of the 
class member. If the class member can make a showing-in fact, 
the same showing that the class representative must make to the 
court-relief must be granted. This individual right, otherwise 
enforceable if brought into court apart from the class action, dis-
tinguishes the class member from the citizen approaching the 
legislature. Second, although it is fashionable to characterize 
court decrees as legislation, the characterization ignores the de-
cree's remedial scope, which is determined by the violation of 
enforceable rights, 121 and its binding effect, which is determined 
by principles of res judicata. Legislative change can occur at the 
whim of the entity that made the original legislation; the judge 
entering a decree, however, cannot predetermine its res judicata 
effects and has only the clumsy tools of Rule 60 to use in an 
attempt to change it retrospectively.122 Perhaps for these rea-
sons, few commentators making the legislative analogy go so far 
as to say unequivocally that procedural due process does not ap-
ply to a Rule 23(b)(2) class member, while they might well un-
hesitatingly say that procedural due process does not apply to a 
citizen affected by legislation.123 
121. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977). 
122. FED. R. C1v. P. 60(b) (specifying conditions and times for modification of de-
crees). See generally Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Re-
form Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1986) (criticizing courts' inflexibility in modify-
ing consent decrees). 
123. It might also be argued that binding class action decisions need not carry due 
process protection for absent class members because the decree operates in the same 
fashion as stare decisis. Stare decisis negatively affects the cases of persons who are not 
before the decision maker. But no one would argue that those negatively affected persons 
have a due process right to be heard. See Rhode, supra note 45, at 1197; Weinstein, 
supra note 98, at 446; Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 120, at 
1349. Nevertheless, the difference of degree of negative effect is so great that it should 
entail due process protections. Res judicata forecloses all argument and all evidence. 
Stare decisis affects only issues of law and even then permits resort to a court parallel 
with or above that rendering the first decision. If the first decision is an unappealed trial 
court determination, it will have full res judicata effect but little stare decisis effect (un-
less the same judge is assigned to the subsequent case). Indeed, this reality is the basis of 
defendants' frequent disregard of adverse precedent. See supra text accompanying notes 
32-39. 
Moreover, the stare decisis argument proves too much. It implies that even in non-
class action cases, due process protections need not be afforded when a prior case 
brought by a stranger has "determined" an issue adversely. In fact, the litigant is heard 
to argue that stare decisis should not be applied, and the litigant is permitted to go up 
the appellate ladder. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) ("It 
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B. Due Process Requirements 
If the interests of class members in Rule 23(b)(2) actions are 
property, there is still a question of what protections due process 
requires for them in the context of the class action. Two prelimi-
nary responses should be considered. The first is the argument 
that representatives bind others in legal claims in many con-
texts, so class representatives' binding of absent class members 
must be acceptable regardless of how few safeguards exist. 
Unions, guardians ad litem, and the United States Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission all bind others in their law-
suits.124 But in each of these cases, there is at least some form of 
consent, either actual or implied, for the representative to be do-
ing the binding. 126 With respect to the executor whose suit binds 
afterborn heirs, the nature of the right is different. The conduct 
of the executor determines the nature of the estate to which the 
afterborn heir has a claim. By contrast, one heir would not pre-
sume to sue on behalf of another heir without the latter's con-
sent. Self-appointed binding representation without mandatory 
notice and consent is found nowhere but in Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions. 126 
A second argument is that the terms of Rule 23(b)(2) itself 
limit the procedural protections that due process requires. But 
Rule 23(b)(2) is the very procedure whose constitutionality is at 
issue. With respect to state procedural provisions, the Supreme 
Court has stated, "[B]ecause 'minimum [procedural] require-
is a violation of due process for the judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a 
party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard."). 
124. See Hutchinson, supra note 109, at 489 (arguing that such examples establish 
the due process of binding class actions under an interest, rather than a consent, theory). 
125. Notice and at least tacit consent are present in EEOC and other governmental 
cases that bind third parties. E.g., General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980). 
Some consider the preclusion of those with notice who do not come forward in pending 
litigation as equitable preclusion, which may be taken as a form of implied consent. See 
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, C1v1L PROCEDURE 651-52 (3d ed. 1985); see also Marino v. Ortiz, 
108 S. Ct. 586 (1988) (affirming by an equally divided court the decision that a class of 
affected employers who knew of a pending discrimination suit but chose not to intervene 
could not collaterally attack the consent decree in the case). 
126. 
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that 
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not 
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of 
process .... 
To these general rules there is a recognized exception that . . . the judgment 
in a 'class' ... suit ... may bind members of the class ... who were not made 
parties to it. 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940). 
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ments [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by 
the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures 
that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to 
adverse official action.' "127 The minimum requirements of due 
process, therefore, must be arrived at independently, and the 
terms of the Rule place no barriers on what the law demands. 
These arguments aside, one may turn to two leading cases, 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 128 and Mathews v. Eldridge, 129 
to determine what due process requires in the context of a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action. 
1. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts- A first approach to the 
question does what the Supreme Court said it was not doing in 
the 1985 case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. Plaintiffs filed 
a class action in the Kansas state courts over Phillips' failure to 
make interest payments on royalties from mineral leases that 
the class members possessed. 130 The average class member's po-
tential damages were about $100.131 The Kansas Supreme Court 
affirmed a judgment against Phillips and in favor of the class 
against a challenge by Phillips132 that the trial court's assertion 
of jurisdiction over the case violated due process.133 The United 
States Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas courts did not vio-
late due process by asserting jurisdiction, even though ninety-
seven percent of the leaseholders were nonresidents of 
Kansas. 134 
The Court's discussion of due process focused on the territori-
ality issue. Pennoyer v. Neff 3 ri established in 1877 that due pro-
127. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (quoting Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (emendation in original)). 
128. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
129. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
130. 472 U.S. at 799. 
131. Id. at 801. 
132. The United States Supreme Court ruled that Phillips had the ability to assert 
the objection. Id. at 803. For a criticism of this ruling, and of much of the remainder of 
the Court's opinion, see Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 255, 267 (1985). 
133. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984). 
134. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-14 (1985). Articles critical of 
this decision include Kennedy, supra note 132, and Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts: Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: A Definite Forum, But Is It Proper?, 19 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 483 (1986). Other articles discussing the case are Miller & Crump, 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986), and Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, Proce-
dural Due Process and Absent Class Plaintiffs: Minimum Contacts is Out-Is Individ-
ual Notice In?, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 817 (1986) [hereinafter Individual Notice). 
135. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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cess was the governing principle in the application of restrictions 
on state assertions of jurisdiction over extraterritorial defen-
dants. Nevertheless, the Court in Shutts did not restrict its 
holding to those due process concerns that govern territoriality. 
It stated flatly: "We therefore hold that the protection afforded 
the plaintiff class members by the Kansas statute satisfies the 
Due Process Clause. "136 The factors the Court assessed in decid-
ing the territoriality issue are those one would expect the Court 
to use if it were assessing the due process of binding those class 
members for whom territoriality was not an issue. The holding 
then might be summarized: The decision of this case by the 
Kansas courts under the Kansas class action statute does not 
deprive absent class members who are not Kansas citizens of 
due process; a fortiori it does not deprive Kansas citizens of that 
right. 137 
The Court in Shutts had to decide whether the nonconsensual 
assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs implicates 
due process.138 In a passage that recognizes the theory of due 
process that has evolved in the last twenty years, the Court first 
asked whether a property or liberty interest was at stake. The 
Court responded affirmatively: "[P]etitioner correctly points out 
that a chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property 
interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs [in the class]."139 In a 
footnote, the Court was careful to restrict this holding to class 
actions for monetary relief.140 But the new property analysis out-
lined above, if correct, would extend the Court's discussion to 
suits for injunctive and declaratory relief.141 
In determining the due process adequacy of the protections 
that the Kansas courts afforded the absent nonresident plaintiff 
136. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 814. 
137. This rationale raises the possibility that where no territoriality question is pres-
ent, the flexible requirements of due process might bend even farther to uphold existing 
class action procedures. This Article argues against such an interpretation. See infra text 
accompanying notes 157-60. 
138. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), established that a plain-
tiff need not have minimum contacts with a state forum; but the situation in Keeton of 
an individual voluntarily filing suit in a distant forum suggests a waiver analysis not 
necessarily applicable to the situation of an absent plaintiff class member. The Shutts 
court cites Keeton for the proposition that personal jurisdiction objections may be 
waived. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
139. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306 (1950)). 
140. Id. at 811-12 n.3 ("Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek 
to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judg-
ments. We intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seek-
ing equitable relief."). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 110-19. 
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class members, the Court first distinguished the situation of 
these individuals from that of nonresident defendants. It said 
that the burdens of being forced to participate in the litigation 
and being vulnerable to individual liability were low or nonexis-
tent for the class members.142 The Court found that a "mini-
mum contacts" requirement was inappropriate. The Court nev-
ertheless did hold that there were due process minima for the 
absent plaintiff class member. To afford "minimal due process 
protection," the court hearing the class action must give each 
class member individual notice and an opportunity to partici-
pate in the litigation.143 The court must also afford the right to 
opt out and guarantee adequate representation.144 The Court 
held that due process did not require an "opt in" procedure. 14~ 
Apart from the citations to Mullane, 146 Eisen, 147 and Hans-
berry, 148 the Court gave no reasoning to support its conclusion 
that these due process minima apply. But the argument based 
on Mullane is easy to see. In Mullane, the Court found that no-
tice and the opportunity to be heard are historically important 
characteristics of court adjudication. They are essentials of those 
court procedures that observers in the Anglo-American tradition 
consider fundamentally fair. 149 They are basic in the sense that 
no other procedural rights can be exercised unless one has the 
opportunity, and knowledge of the opportunity, to exercise 
142. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. The burdens on the defendant that a plaintiff class 
member escapes are the need to travel to and hire counsel in a distant forum, to partici-
pate in discovery, and to face liability for costs and possible attorneys fees if the case is 
lost. Plaintiff class members are also said to be free from cross- or counter-claims or any 
form of coercive, punitive, or damages remedies. Id. 
143. Id. at 811-12. 
The plaintiff [class member) must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard 
and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The no-
tice must be the best practicable, "reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections." The notice should describe the 
action and the plaintiffs' rights in it. 
Id. at 812 (citations omitted). 
144. 
Additionally, we hold that due process requires at a minimum that an absent 
plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by 
executing and returning an "opt out" or "request for exclusion" form to the 
court. Finally, the Due Process Clause of course requires that the named plain-
tiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent class members. 
Id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43, 45 (1940)). 
145. Id. 
146. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
147. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
148. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
149. 339 U.S. at 314. 
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them.1 C1° And the factual setting in Mullane, as noted above, is 
similar to the setting of a plaintiff class action. m 
Eisen appears barely relevant. It upheld a requirement of in-
dividual notice for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, but did so as an inter-
pretation of the Rule and in response to a challenge regarding 
the imposition of costs on the defendant, not in response to a 
challenge by an absent class member who had not been notified 
or by a person raising an objection on the class member's be-
half. 1112 In fact, the Eisen Court explicitly disavowed reliance on 
the due process clause in upholding the notice requirement. It 
chose instead to rely exclusively on Rule 23(b)(3).1113 
Hansberry supports the proposition that the failure to provide 
adequate representation violates due process if the adjudication 
binds an absent class member.1114 Hansberry, however, did not 
consider any requirement of notice and the right to opt out, thus 
leaving open the possibility that such a right might afford sub-
stitute protection.1 C1C1 The Court in Shutts appears to have an-
swered this open question in the negative. Representative ade-
quacy, notice, and the right to opt out are separate, minimum 
requirements. 
150. Id. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 110-17. 
152. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-79 (1974). 
153. Id. at 177. 
154. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940), involved an action to enjoin a 
breach of a racially restrictive covenant. The covenant, by its terms, was not effective 
unless the owners of 95% of the frontage area covered by the covenant signed it. The 
blacks defending in the action argued that 95% had not signed. The trial court found 
that only 54% had indeed signed, but still held that the covenant was effective because 
in an earlier class action to enforce the covenant, representatives of a plaintiff class com-
prising all land owners had stipulated that 95% had signed, and the stipulation, though 
untrue, was not fraudulently or collusively made. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, 
but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that because of the conflict be-
tween the interests of the class representatives in the earlier suit and those of the de-
fendants in the present, representation of the latter by the former did not satisfy the 
requirements of due process. The class representatives wanted to enforce the covenant; 
the defendants in Hansberry had "a substantial interest ... in resisting performance." 
Id. at 46. "[R)epresentation in this case no more satisfies the requirements of due pro-
cess than a trial by a judicial officer who . . . may have an interest in the outcome of the 
litigation in conflict with that of the litigants." Id. at 45. See generally Kamp, The His-
tory Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 481 (1987) (discussing case). 
155. Hansberry, in fact, merely says that due process operates to protect class mem-
bers. Id. at 42. Some commentators have taken this to impose a notice requirement. 
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 344 (1948) ("Cer-
tainly the Hansberry case clearly indicates that no judgment will be binding on members 
of the class who do not receive notice of the pendency of the action."). That article also 
suggests that notice and the opportunity to participate in the litigation should be the 
only requirements for protection of class members in all class actions. Id. at 348-49. 
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The context of Shutts, as well as some, but by no means all, of 
its language, limits its analysis of due process to the situation of 
the out-of-state class member. Furthermore, the analysis is ex-
plicitly restricted to cases "concerning claims wholly or predomi-
nately for money judgments."1116 But the text provides little that 
would bar the analysis from the evaluation of the due process 
implications of binding absent class members in Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions. Although the case stresses territoriality, and the 
United States District Courts are said to have unquestioned ter-
ritorial jurisdiction over the entire United States,1117 the burden 
placed on plaintiff class members-specifically, the fact that 
"[a]n adverse judgment ... may extinguish the chose in action 
forever through res judicata"1118-is precisely the same in a fed-
eral as in a state class action. All those burdens associated with 
defending in a geographically remote forum disappear in the sit-
uation of a plaintiff class action, state or federal. Whether the 
class action is in state or federal court, "an absent class-action 
plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and 
allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that 
there are safeguards provided for his protection. " 1119 If the out-
of-state plaintiff class member in a state case is nevertheless en-
titled to notice and the right to opt out, and to adequacy of rep-
resentation, the member of a plaintiff class in the federal court 
should be entitled to the same protections.160 
The expressed restriction in Shutts to cases involving mone-
tary relief should yield to the analysis expounded above with re-
156. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985); see supra note 
140 and accompanying text. 
157. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 125, at 69. But see Lusardi, Nationwide Ser-
vice of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 
1 (1988) (suggesting that due process requires a restriction); Stephens, The Federal 
Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court Assertions of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 18 U. R1cH. L. REV. 697 (1984) (same). See generally Mullenix, supra note 
8, at 1065 (discussing territoriality objection to federal class action proceedings where 
opt out is not permitted). 
158. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807. 
159. Id. at 810. 
160. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), does not 
reveal whether its notice analysis extends only to persons outside the forum state. The 
case challenged the territorial jurisdiction of New York: "We are met at the outset with a 
challenge to the power of the State-the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against 
those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York." Id. at 311. 
Though this language would limit the applicability of Mullane to territorial jurisdic-
tion, the Court has applied it generally as the expression of the due process standards of 
notice and the right to be heard in any adjudication. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). Just as 
the significance of Mullane has expanded from due process in the assertion of territorial 
jurisdiction to due process in general, Shutts should too. See generally Keefe, Levy & 
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spect to due process protection of nonmonetary claims.161 The 
Supreme Court has held that such claims are entitled to due 
process protection proportionate to the significance of the non-
monetary interest. 162 In many cases, the value of nonmonetary 
relief will far exceed the average $100 that class members had at 
stake in Shutts. The only questions that remain would be: (1) 
whether the class members' supposed unanimity in seeking the 
same sort of relief is a substitute due process safeguard; and (2) 
whether the supposedly legislative nature of Rule 23(b)(2) relief, 
apart from this consideration of unanimity of goal, implies ei-
ther the absence of a protected interest or a reduced need for 
the protections of notice, the right to opt out, and adequacy of 
representation. 
With respect to the first question, in many subdivision (b)(2) 
cases, predominantly but not exclusively institutional cases, 
there will be no unanimity with respect to the desired relief .163 
Donovan, supra note 155, at 346 (arguing that notice and the right to be heard should be 
the fundamental concerns in due process doctrine regarding territorial jurisdiction). 
Even Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the first case to assimilate territorial juris-
diction into due process, had a significant role in establishing notice and the right to be 
heard as due process standards, despite the fact that the case was decided essentially on 
principles of state sovereignty and international law and mentioned notice almost in 
passing. See id. at 726-27 (only two paragraphs in the middle of the opinion mentioning 
the function of notice in preventing oppression and fraud); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & 
A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 101 (1985) (noting that Pennoyer was decided on grounds of 
public international law and that the due process discussion of Pennoyer was technically 
dicta because the fourteenth amendment was not in effect at the time of judgment in the 
trial court); cf. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 230 (citing Pennoyer as establishing due 
process minimum of notice). 
Two commentators analyzing territorial jurisdiction issues in mass tort class actions 
have remarked on the absence of notice and the right to be heard in subdivision (b)(2) 
cases as a possible due process violation apart from territorial considerations. Mullenix, 
supra note 8, at 1065; Note, Mechanical and Constitutional Problems in the Certifica-
tion of Mandatory Multistate Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 517, 544 (1983). 
One view of this controversy holds that notice and the right to be heard stand as due 
process requirements only in the absence of a territorial jurisdiction problem. Opt out 
may be denied on the ground that consent is needed only in territorial jurisdiction dis-
putes, but not in other cases. Miller & Crump, supra note 134, at 31. See generally 
Individual Notice, supra note 134, at 831 (arguing that a notice and opt out scheme, but 
not individual notice, is the due process minimum, even in the absence of territorial 
jurisdiction concerns). This view, however, seems at war with the concepts of the framers 
of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 who provided for the right to opt out despite the 
absence of territorial jurisdiction problems in the cases where the right applies. 
161. But see Miller & Crump, supra note 134, at 28. This Article asserts that with 
respect to Rule 23(b)(2), the right to opt out is of fundamental importance to the class 
member but of significance to the adverse party and judicial administration only in insti-
tutional cases. See infra text accompanying notes 229-40. 
162. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-64 (1970). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 68-79. Professor Wood seems to rely mostly 
on this idea and related concepts in contending that Shutts should not be extended to 
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By contrast, in monetary relief cases, the desires of the class 
members are likely to be clearer and more closely unani-
mous-more money.16• 
The answer to the second question is the same as the response 
to the argument that Rule 23(b)(2)'s "legislative effect" obviates 
the need for due process protection: the bar created by a class 
action adjudication is both harsher and more personal than a 
legislative decision. 1611 An application of Shutts to Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions demonstrates that the minimum due process re-
quirements of notice and the opportunity to opt out are conspic-
uously absent. The Rule therefore violates due process. 
2. Mathews v. Eldridge- An alternative approach to 
whether Rule 23(b)(2) affords adequate protection to absent 
class members is to consider the familiar calculus of due process 
set out in Mathews v. Eldridge. 166 According to Eldridge, a court 
should weigh the following factors: (1) the significance of the ab-
sent class member's interest and the finality of the deprivation; 
(2) the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of the class member's 
interest, given current safeguards and the benefit of alternative 
protections; and (3) any interest in maintaining the status quo, 
including the cost of additional or substitute procedures.167 The 
procedure violates due process if it fails upon consideration of 
these factors. Relative weight of the factors is unclear, but com-
parisons may be drawn to other procedures that have been up-
held or struck down. 168 
The significance of the absent class member's interest varies 
greatly from case to case. In a welfare class action, a change in 
procedures for contesting terminations of assistance may be the 
difference between life and death ( or between life and a very 
require notice and individual opportunity to be heard in all class actions. Wood, Adjudi-
catory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597 (1987). 
164. Yeazell, supra note 98, at 1111. 
165. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
166. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
167. Id. at 335. 
168. Eldridge has been used to evaluate administrative procedures. See, e.g., Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978) (administrative procedure 
for cutoff of service from municipally-owned utility company); Smith v. Organization of 
Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 849 (1977) (administrative proce-
dure for removing children from foster families). Eldridge has also been applied to evalu-
ate judicial procedures. E.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 
(1981) (refusing to appoint counsel for indigent mother at court hearing on termination 
of parental rights). Commentators have criticized the Eldridge test, e.g., Mashaw, The 
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 28 (1976), 
but the Court still applies it; see also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 
473 U.S. 305, 313 (1985); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982). 
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death-like life). The fact that class members have not filed their 
own cases or joined as named plaintiffs may mean that the inter-
est is not important, but it may instead mean that the class 
members are simply unaware of the interest or unable to afford 
lawyers. To the extent that the interest is merely the right to 
control the litigation that affects one's own rights, it may be less 
valuable than the underlying rights themselves. Such an inter-
est, however, defies calculation and therefore is difficult to weigh 
in any judicial balance. The deprivation is quite final: Res judi-
cata forever bars the class members from challenging the out-
come of the class action. 
The current safeguards that Rule 23(b)(2) provides for class 
members' interests are: (1) the court must find that the named 
plaintiff is a fair and adequate representative; (2) both court ap-
proval and mandatory notice must accompany all class settle-
ments; and (3) the court may order notice when it deems notice 
appropriate. Although these safeguards have some value, they 
have weaknesses as well. These weaknesses appear whether the 
case results in an adjudicated victory, is settled, or loses. 
The only mandatory protection in a case that is won through a 
litigated decision is representative adequacy. But even adequate 
representatives compromise the interests of some class members, 
even in cases where the class wins in court. In a successful public 
policy class action about welfare policies, for example, the usual 
litigated victory is a declaratory judgment and injunction 
against the welfare department practice and issuance of notice 
to all class members who can be reached, informing them of 
their rights to use state procedures to claim any past-due bene-
fits. In many cases where a court resolves the merits, an agree-
ment of the parties nevertheless decides the proposed relief. 
In these situations, even a representative that any court would 
consider adequate may compromise the rights of some class 
members by agreeing to terms of injunctive or notice relief that 
will effectively exclude some class members from benefits of one 
sort or another. The reason the representative agrees is the rep-
resentative's prediction that the court would otherwise order less 
favorable terms. There is nothing inadequate in the representa-
tive's performance, but legitimate, enforceable interests of class 
members are still being traded away. Partial settlement, either 
explicit or tacit, occurs in any instance where the named plain-
tiff does not press for everything that everyone in the class 
might possibly get, in order to appear reasonable or not risk los-
ing credibility with the court. This form of settlement takes 
place with respect to individual aspects of a case on a daily ha-
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sis. 169 Because notice and court approval must only accompany 
settlements of the entirety of a case, however, the safeguards of 
mandatory notice and a fairness hearing on a proposed settle-
ment do not apply.170 
The amount of protection afforded by the notice of settlement 
and fairness hearing is minimal for cases that are formally set-
tled. The right the Rule gives a class member is merely to learn 
as much about the action as is contained in the notice and then 
have the court consider whether the member's individual objec-
tions are enough to upset the settlement of the class as a whole. 
The Rule gives no right to opt out if the class member remains 
dissatisfied. There is no hearing on the individual's suit against 
the defendant, merely a hearing on the fairness of the general 
settlement. 
For a case that loses, there is an inevitable "settlement" with-
out notice and the opportunity to be heard whenever the named 
plaintiff chooses not to appeal. The decision not to appeal fore-
closes the rights of class members to have the case reviewed. But 
conflicting interests color this choice, even for the most fair-
minded representative. On the one hand, the representative 
must bear the litigation costs of an appeal and the outlook for 
success may well be grim. On the other, the absent class mem-
bers have some possibility of gain from an appeal, and abso-
lutely nothing to lose-they will be equally bound by a district 
court decision as by one from the Supreme Court. The represen-
tative will make a decision, but the class members will not par-
ticipate, despite the fact that their interests are directly adverse 
to those of the representative.171 
The analysis so far has been premised on the idea that the 
property interest at stake is the relief that the class member is 
lawfully entitled to from the court that hears the class member's 
cause of action. But if one considers the protected interest to be 
169. Professor Chayes notes how this process takes on an explicitly settlement-ori-
ented character in the formulation of relief after a contest over liability. With respect to 
complex cases, Chayes notes: 
Each party recognizes that it must make some response to the demands of the 
other party, for issues left unresolved will be submitted to the court, a recourse 
that is always chancy and may result in a solution less acceptable than might be 
reached by horse-trading .... Indeed, relief by way of order after a determina-
tion on the merits tends to converge with relief through a consent decree or 
voluntary settlement. 
Chayes, supra note 26, at 1299 (1976). 
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 
171. Cf. D. RHODE, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN EDUCATIONAL REFORM LITIGATION 17 
(1982) (describing incentives for class counsel to prefer settlement to dubious appeal and 
for class members to prefer appeal). 
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the right to use the judicial system to adjudicate the individual's 
claim, irrespective of the claim's merits in actually entitling the 
class member to relief, 172 the analysis applies even more 
strongly. None of the existing safeguards affords the class mem-
ber protection of this interest, because none affords the class 
member control over his or her individual claim. Representative 
adequacy does not suffice. Adequacy measures performance of 
the representative against the judge's expectations for reasona-
ble performance. It bears no relation to any form of individual-
ized consent. No one asks the class member to agree to the rep-
resentative's taking charge of the case.173 Hence, the situation 
compares to an unauthorized suit of any type. Where suit is 
brought without the plaintiff's authority, and there is even the 
slightest failure in getting all that the plaintiff might possibly 
ask for, it does no good to say that the unauthorized representa-
tive did an "adequate" and "fair" job. In any context but a class 
action, the plaintiff who did not give authorization would not be 
held to the judgment.174 To hold a plaintiff to such a judgment 
would constitute deprivation without due process of a personal 
right to use a system of adjudication to obtain one's own deci-
sion. Just as representative adequacy does not protect the inter-
est in control over one's case, the settlement rights to notice and 
a fairness hearing fail to protect this interest. The fairness hear-
ing is not an individual adjudication under the class member's 
control. Instead, it is a general consideration of the fairness of 
the terms of settlement to the class as a whole. 175 Therefore, 
there are no existing safeguards to weigh in the Mathews v. El-
dridge balance. Accordingly, the Eldridge step addressed to the 
adequacy of existing safeguards might dictate a finding of due 
process violation without any further consideration. 
The value of the alternative safeguards of notice and the right 
to opt out are as difficult to calculate as the value of existing 
safeguards. Although few people now respond to opt-out notices 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19, 172-75. 
173. As early as 1941, two commentators noted the due process objection to binding 
adjudications without notice and the right to control one's own case. Kalven & Rosen-
field, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 710 (1941). 
174. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981). Two recent cases, Williams v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 
832 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1298 (1988), and Hastings-
Murtaugh v. Texas Air Corp., 119 F.R.D. 450, 456 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1988), note in passing 
that representative adequacy, discretionary notice, and fairness hearings exist to ensure 
that class members receive adequate due process protection of their interests. Neither 
case, however, takes up the argument that the safeguards are in fact inadequate. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
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in Rule 23(b)(3) cases, poor drafting of the notices may be the 
main cause.176 Relatively few people appear at fairness hearings 
on class settlements now, and fewer still voice relevant con-
cerns.177 But the right to opt out is both easier to exercise and 
more likely to accomplish its immediate goal than the right to 
speak before a judge in an attempt to upset an agreement the 
litigants have endorsed. It would take experience under a rule 
that affords notice and the right to opt out to give a clear 
answer. 
The interest that exists in preserving the status quo and the 
cost of the alternatives is the final factor to consider in applying 
the Mathews v. Eldridge test. One alternative is simply doing 
without Rule 23(b)(2). But the cost of that option is too high to 
pay. Subdivision (b)(2) is of critical importance in the enforce-
ment of federally-secured rights, and no good alternative is 
available.178 If the only alternative to the Rule is its invalidation, 
the Rule may pass muster under the final step of the Eldridge 
test, even though it does badly on the first two steps.179 But the 
validity of this approach is doubtful, because the real interest at 
stake might be considered to be the ability to use judicial proce-
dures. For a given class member, this interest is totally elimi-
nated rather than merely burdened. 180 There are no protections 
at all for this interest in step two of the analysis, so under El-
dridge even elimination of the procedure might be required to 
secure due process, in the absence of any alternative.181 
176. D. RHODE, supra note 171, at 32. Nevertheless, the large number of opt outs in 
Shutts (3400 of 33,000) should not be ignored. Good drafting may increase the opt out 
rate. The fact that the amount of attorneys fees may depend on the size of the class 
(particularly in Rule 23(b)(3) actions) creates a disincentive for plaintiffs to draft well 
and presents a need for the court to take an active role. Several absurd responses to class 
notices are collected in Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 
313, 332. 
177. D. RHODE, supra note 171, at 32. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 31-79. 
179. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (holding that informal, nonadver-
sary procedure for placing prisoner in administrative segregation affords sufficient due 
process protection given strong state interest in prison order); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 
55 (1979) (permitting summary suspension of horse trainer's license given magnitude of 
state interest in having means of acting swiftly about charges of drugging). 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19. 
181. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding that despite strong govern-
mental interest in transferring mentally ill prisoners to mental hospital, absence of any 
notice and opportunity for hearing violates due process); Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that despite public utility's interest in cutting 
off service to delinquent customers, absence of any notice and opportunity for hearing 
violates due process). 
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An option that does not entail complete invalidation of the 
subdivision is to require that a Rule 23(b)(2) class be afforded 
precertification notice and the right to opt out, in line with the 
rights of a subdivision (b)(3) class. Here the social cost appears 
much lower. Rule 23(b)(2) remains available for use in public 
policy and institutional cases. But that appearance is deceiving 
because it still must be determined who will pay for the notice. 
If the cost cannot be shifted to the defendant, impecunious 
plaintiffs-the very people for whom subdivision (b)(2) was 
designed-will lose their ability to use it. 
Eisen u. Carlisle & Jacquelin182 would bar shifting the cost to 
the defendant. Eisen, decided in 1974, was a class action 
brought under Rule 23(b)(3) alleging violations of the antitrust 
and securities exchange laws. The named plaintiff sought dam-
ages on behalf of six million odd-lot stock traders against two 
brokerage firms that controlled ninety-nine percent of the odd-
lot trading business for the relevant time period, 1962 to 1966. 
After a first interlocutory appeal, the district court held eviden-
tiary hearings and ordered that the suit be maintained as a class 
action. Because the case was a Rule 23(b)(3) action, individual 
notice advising class members of the right to opt out was re-
quired under subdivision (c)(2). With respect to notice, the court 
found that 2.25 million of the class members could be identified 
by name and address with reasonable effort. Because notifying 
all these individuals would have cost at least $225,000, however, 
and because even a much lower cost would have forced the 
plaintiff to withdraw the action, the court devised a less exten-
sive notice plan. The court provided for individual notice to New 
York Stock Exchange member firms, bank trust departments, 
odd-lot traders with numerous transactions, and 5000 other ran-
domly selected class members, and publication notice in the 
Wall Street Journal and New York and California newspapers 
to the rest of the class. This plan was to cost about $21,700. The 
court also ordered that, in light of evidence adduced at a prelim-
inary hearing showing that the plaintiff was "more than likely" 
to win at trial, the defendants had to pay ninety percent of the 
cost of the notice. 183 
182. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
183. The Court of Appeals ordered the suit dismissed as a class action on several 
grounds. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court 
vacated that decision and remanded, upholding the Court of Appeals' position that indi-
vidual notice to all identifiable class members was required and that the cost could not 
be shifted to defendants, but stating that plaintiff might propose a smaller, redefined 
class. 417 U.S. at 179 n.16. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that subdivision (c)(2) means what 
it says, "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, in-
cluding individual notice to all members who can be identified 
through reasonable effort. "18" Thus, the Court held that the 
class action had to be dismissed unless all class members whose 
names and addresses could reasonably be identified were given 
individual notice. 
The Court further ruled that the district court erred in impos-
ing the cost of notice on the defendants. The Court found no 
authority in Rule 23 to hold a preliminary hearing on the likeli-
hood of success on the merits. In the absence of anything in the 
Rule authorizing cost shifting, the plaintiff had to bear the "or-
dinary burden of financing his own suit,"1811 which included any 
necessary notice. The Court buttressed its position with a num-
ber of observations: (1) the procedure unfairly benefited the 
plaintiff by giving him a preliminary finding on the merits of the 
case, which might prejudice the defendants unduly because it 
lacked the procedural protections of a trial; (2) the procedure 
prevented the court from determining class action status as soon 
as practicable after the commencement of the action, as required 
by Rule 23(c)(l); and (3) the procedure entailed a determination 
of the merits as part of the class certification process, which tra-
ditionally is forbidden. 188 
Due process requires individual notice to all reasonably identi-
fiable class members in binding Rule 23(b)(2) actions as surely 
as Eisen required it in Rule 23(b)(3) actions. If the Court ac-
cepted this position as a matter of due process doctrine, there 
would still remain nothing in the text of Rule 23 permitting a 
district court to shift any of the cost of precertification notice to 
the defendants. Indeed, the various supplementary concerns 
mentioned by the Court in Eisen would serve to rule out a pre-
184. FED. R. C,v. P. 23 (c)(2). The Court pointed out that the Advisory Committee, 
following Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), believed 
that individual notice to all identifiable class members was a fundamental requirement 
of due process. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-74. The Court noted the due process consideration 
that the class action judgment binds class members even if unfavorable, and stated that 
the members therefore were entitled to request exclusion or fuller participation. Id. at 
176. These comments could be considered dicta in light of the Court's primary reliance 
on the text of the Rule. When the plaintiff argued that the high cost of notice and the 
low value of the class members' claims should be considered, the Court replied curtly 
that subdivision (c)(2) made no exceptions: "There is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that 
the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs." 
Id. 
185. 417 U.S. at 179. 
186. Id. at 177-78. 
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liminary hearing on the merits in subdivision (b)(2) cases as well 
as in subdivision (b)(3) cases. 
The problem of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action is that binding 
absent class members without giving them notice and the right 
to opt out violates due process. The problem is clear under the 
apparently applicable standards of Phillips Petroleum Co. u. 
Shutts. 187 Indeed, the only way in which the binding Rule 
23(b)(2) class action might be seen not to be a violation of due 
process is if one follows Mathews u. Eldridge and weighs the 
harm to the interests of absentees with the cost of the alterna-
tive safeguard of notice and the right to opt out. If one con-
cludes that because of Eisen the requirement of notice will elim-
inate the subdivision (b)(2) action in many areas in which it is 
most useful, the benefit of the alternative safeguard might be so 
costly that the current procedure will be taken to afford due 
process.188 This analysis, however, works only if the interest at 
stake is not the right to an individual hearing, but only the un-
derlying interest in the suit.189 Nevertheless, even if such an ap-
proach did protect the present procedure from the charge that it 
violates due process, other procedures still might better protect 
the interests of all concerned. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Although one might press for a Rule revision that would per-
mit the cost-shifting procedure the Eisen Court prohibited, it 
seems unlikely that the Court would overrule itself by rulemak-
ing, 190 especially because Eisen received as much praise as con-
187. 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 156-65. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 169-79. 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81. 
190. Regardless of the merits, such a proposal faces the immediate political obstacle 
that few rule revisions ever directly challenge a Supreme Court precedent. In general, 
they tend to build on Supreme Court decisions, as one might expect from the fact that 
any proposed revision must obtain Supreme Court adoption. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 11 
advisory committee's note (1983) ("The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem 
[of abuses in pleading] by building upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permit-
ting the court to award expenses .... "); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (Supreme Court 
adoption of rules). Another drawback of such a proposal is its inevitable collision with 
the desire to determine class status independently of the merits and to do so early in the 
litigation. The proposal advocated by this Article will not delay class determinations but 
may delay determination of their binding effects. See infra text accompanying notes 214-
22. 
A 1985 proposal by the American Bar Association Section of Litigation to amend Rule 
23 undoes Eisen in a less drastic way by keeping the costs where they fall but making 
notice in all cases permissive rather than mandatory. Section of Litig., American Bar 
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demnation. 191 The problem is the clash between the desire for 
inexpensive classwide relief and the necessity to afford notice 
and the right to be heard to all class members. 
The solution to this problem may lie in the fact that it is not 
the two-sided clash that this phrasing suggests, but instead a 
three-sided conflict. The neglected third term is the rule of pre-
clusion. The only reason that the absentees' interests are 
harmed is that res judicata bars their causes of action from be-
ing raised in later, separate actions. As noted above, the framers 
of the 1966 revision of Rule 23 imposed the res judicata bar be-
cause the previous procedure offended then current ideas of mu-
tuality of estoppel.192 Some courts had permitted nonbinding 
"spurious" class actions with post-decision opt-in by class mem-
bers who wanted relief.193 The solution to the due process prob-
lem lies in a revival of the pre-1966 "spurious" class action. 
A. The Spurious Class Action 
Thomas Atkins Street coined the term "spurious class action" 
in 1909 to refer to class actions that do not involve specific funds 
or property in which each class member has an interest. 194 He 
called common property or fund suits "true" class actions. The 
results in true class actions bound all class members by res judi-
cata despite the existence of a federal equity rule saying that 
Ass'n, Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Im-
provements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 202 (1986). This proposal combines the worst of both 
worlds, permitting infringement of due process rights in some cases as well as causing 
litigants to forego class treatment due to inability to pay for notice in others. The appar-
ent objective is a decree that will bind absentees, even though the Report concludes: 
"Post 1966 developments involving the the [sic] collateral estoppel effects of a prior 
judgment and modification of the common law mutuality doctrine raise difficulties not 
contemplated by those who drafted the (1966) rule." Id. at 199. In other words, the au-
thors of the proposal acknowledge that the mutuality argument for having a decree bind-
ing all class members no longer holds. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text. 
See generally supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing framers' preoccupation with 
mutuality). For a discussion of the history of the ABA proposal, see infra note 219. 
191. E.g., Bennett, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Supreme Court Calls for Revamp-
ing of Class Action Strategy, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 801; Case Comment, Federal Jurisdic-
tion-Civil Procedure-Glass Actions-Solutions for Consumer and Environmental 
Wrongs Are Not Embodied in Federal Rule 23, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 986 (1975); Recent 
Development, Federal Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Plaintiffs Must Bear Costs of 
Notice to Individual Class Members in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions As Required by Rule 
23(c)(2), 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 100 (1974). 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 104-15. 
193. E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 
1962), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963). 
194. T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE 342 (1909). 
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decrees in class actions had no binding effect on absentees. m All 
other class cases concerned not a common fund or property, but 
a personal liability. "Here the suit is not a class suit in any 
proper sense. We may call it a spurious class suit."196 Distinct 
from the "true" suit by its jurisdictional basis and the nature of 
relief sought, the spurious class action had a different res judi-
cata effect. Street saw the paradigm of this case as the injunc-
tion against a striking union and stated with regard to the effect 
of a decree in such a suit: 
If relief is sought against an unincorporated association 
of individuals or against numerous defendants who are 
acting together, it is obvious that a decree entered in a 
suit against a few only cannot be effective against others 
who are not actually made parties, unless and until they 
are formally brought in and bound by the decree . . .. 197 
The idea of nonbinding spurious class actions persisted de-
spite the deletion of the proviso about not binding absentees in 
195. Id.; see Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842) reprinted in J. HOPKINS, THE NEW FED-
ERAL EQUITY RULES 104-05 (8th ed. 1933). 
Id. 
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without mani-
fest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the 
Court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may 
proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse 
interest of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in 
such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all 
the absent parties. 
The proviso in the Rule about the decree's being without prejudice to absentees was 
not applied in Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853), either on prag-
matic grounds, as suggested in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 226-27, or on the grounds 
suggested by Street, specifically, that the Rule's proviso applied only to class actions that 
were not "true." For true class actions, Street argued that a universal binding effect 
applied as a matter of logic, notwithstanding the provisions of any rule. 
Street's idea apparently relates to the idea of universally binding in rem judgments 
with respect to specific property or funds within the court's jurisdiction. See generally F. 
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 125, at 77 (discussing in rem judgments). Nevertheless, 
old Rule 48's proviso was given effect in Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38, 
57 (1908) (involving multiple bondholders seeking to establish a lien against assets of a 
corporation, where the court had apparent in rem jurisdiction over the corporation's as-
sets). See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 227. 
196. T. STREET, supra note 194, at 342. 
197. Id. at 345. Street also linked this result to the language of the Rule, though he 
placed greater emphasis on the inherent nature of the spurious suit. After describing the 
universal binding effect of the true suit, he stated: "But there is certainly one class of 
cases involving numerous parties in which the reservation of the equity rule is applicable 
in its full and literal sense. This is the spurious class suit, the suit brought by or against 
numerous parties in respect of a personal liability." Id. 
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the 1912 revision198 of the Equity Rules. The original draft of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had no separate class ac-
tion rule at all,199 but, in 1937, James William Moore proposed a 
rule that divided class actions into three categories, with differ-
ing res judicata effects (as well as jurisdictional prerequisites) 
for each.200 In commentary, he gave each category a descriptive 
name.201 The "spurious" class action was one that did not in-
198. Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912), reprinted in J. HOPKINS, supra note 195, at 240. 
199. Rules 26 and 27 on joinder, however, included provisions for class actions. 
Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary 
Draft, 25 GEO. L.J. 551, 570 (1937). 
200. Moore's proposed rule merits quotation in its entirety: 
Class Actions. 
(a) When Action May be Brought. In the following situations, if persons are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such a 
number of them as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on 
behalf of all, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants, when the character or 
rights sought to be enforced for or against the class is 
(1) joint, or common, or derivative in the sense that the owner of a primary 
right neglects or refuses to enforce such right and the class thereby obtains a 
right to enforce the primary right; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do 
or may affect specific property involved in the action; 
(3) several, and there is a question of law or fact common to the several rights. 
(b) Effect of Judgment. The judgment rendered in the first situation is con-
clusive upon the class; in the second situation it is conclusive upon all parties 
and privies to the proceeding, and upon all claims, whether presented in the 
proceeding or not, insofar as they do or may affect specific property involved in 
the proceeding; and in the third situation it is conclusive upon only the parties 
and privies to the proceeding. 
(c) Requisites of Jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of 
citizenship, the citizenship of only the original parties shall be looked to in the 
absence of collusion. 
Where a specified amount in controversy is a requisite of jurisdiction, the ag-
gregate claim of or against the class in the first situation need only be equal to 
such specified amount; but in the second and third situations the several claim 
or claims of or against each member of the class made an original party shall not 
be aggregated, but each such claim must be equal to or in excess of the specified 
amount in controversy. 
Id. at 571-72. 
As noted in the text, the subsections on res judicata effects and jurisdictional requi-
sites were deleted. The Advisory Committee approved the rest of rule with only two 
technical changes. Moore & Cohn, supra note 4, at 555-56. 
201. Moore called the first category in the proposed rule the true class action, the 
second the hybrid. This classification drew on Street to the extent that it hinged on 
whether the multiple claims did or did not involve a specific property or fund. But it also 
drew on traditional concepts expounded by Joseph Story, tying the "true" class action to 
cases where, but for the class action device, an individual suing in equity would need to 
join all persons who might have a stake in the controversy in order to obtain relief on her 
own. See West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424) (Story, 
Circuit Justice). These concepts looked to the relations among the members of the class 
bringing or defending the action, specifically, how they would be treated under conven-
tional equity practice, which called for bringing into the action all persons whose legal 
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volve any common property or fund; it did not carry any res 
judicata effect on absent class members.202 
Moore proposed to codify this res judicata effect, but the Ad-
visory Committee, while adopting the rest of his proposal, de-
leted both the subsection on res judicata effect and the one on 
jurisdictional prerequisites.203 Nevertheless, both Moore's pro-
posed classification of res judicata effects according to the subdi-
interests would be affected. If an individual in a traditional bill in equity would have 
been permitted to act alone to obtain individual relief, and others could do the same 
thing (or refrain from doing so), then that person's right was several. If not, it was either 
(1) joint, as with an unincorporated association, (2) common, as in a creditor's bill, where 
an equity court would award relief to all creditors from a limited fund to avoid unfair 
advantage to the few who filed the bill, or (3) derivative, as in a shareholder's derivative 
suit, where it was not the shareholders' right to assert at all, but a right that the share-
holders as a group could assert on behalf of the corporation. Moore, supra note 199, at 
572-74. Moore blended the jurisdictional ideas of Street with the "jural relations" ideas 
of Story and others. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 314 
(1937). 
One scholar researching the early history of class actions has suggested that Story and 
Moore paid excessive attention to the nature of the individuals approaching the court 
and insufficient attention to the type of multi-party controversy that a court of equity 
might undertake to adjudicate. Yeazell, supra note 98, at 1088-91, 1100-02. Others have 
criticized Moore for failing to adopt a more contemporary, functional approach, saying 
that the emphasis on jural relations was outdated even in 1937 and failed to bear a 
sufficient relation to contemporary res judicata concepts. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 
246. ("This tribute to the memory of Wesley Hohfeld would be more suitable in a law 
review article than in an enactment which is to guide the actions of practical men day in 
and day out." (footnotes omitted)); Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 703-08; 
Keefe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 155, at 334; Note, Federal Class Actions: A Sug-
gested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 822 (1946). Moore nevertheless had 
his supporters. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 59 (1937); 
Pepper, Letter to Arthur J. Keefe, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 349, 350 (1948) (arguing that jural 
relations affect the fairness of asserting jurisdiction and so are tied to due process); Sun-
derland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 16 (1938) ("Rule 23 as to class actions 
is simple and intelligible, which is more than can be said of any rule that I know of 
heretofore promulgated either by statute or court rule."); VanDercreek, The "Is" and 
"Ought" of Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 48 lowA L. REV. 273, 282 (1963). 
202. 
Spurious Class Action. [Subdivision (a) (3)] 
Assume that a railroad negligently sets fire to property, and widespread damage 
to many property owners ensues.· Here there is a question of law or fact common 
to many persons. A, B, and C bring an action on behalf of themselves, and all 
others similarly situated, against the railroad. A, B, and C each must have a 
claim in excess of $3,000 and there must be diversity between them as plaintiffs 
on the one hand and the railroad on the other. Other persons who had been 
injured could intervene regardless of the amount of their claim, or their citizen-
ship. The judgment would bind A, B, C, and privies, the railroad, all who had 
intervened, but would not bind others beyond the principle of stare decisis, 
which operates as to all judgments. 
Moore, supra note 199, at 574-75. 
203. Moore & Cohn, supra note 4, at 555-56. The Committee deleted these 
paragraphs because they considered res judicata and jurisdiction to be substantive is-
sues, outside the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court. Id. at 556. 
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visions of the Rule and his labels for the three types of class 
action stuck. 20• 
Moore saw a limited role for the spurious class action,206 but 
others saw it as an important vehicle for the enforcement of se-
curities, consumer protection, and civil rights law.206 At least one 
commentator noted a great increase in the filing of class actions 
in the decade following the enactment of Rule 23. He attributed 
the increase to the new prominence of the Rule and the fact that 
Moore had provided a full commentary on it in his treatise. 207 
Others observed an increase in the use of class actions in specific 
contexts and linked this increase to the wide applicability of the 
spurious class action in dealing with current social ills.208 In any 
event, courts widely approved of the spurious class action, de-
clared that the decree in such cases did not bind absentees to 
their detriment,209 and held that absentees could intervene after 
204. His prompt publication of an article and a highly influential treatise, both of 
which argued for the proposed res judicata effects and repeated the labels, probably 
caused this event. See. id. at 561-63; 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1!1! 23.01-23.09 (1938). 
205. Moore saw the spurious class action as a "permissive joinder device," useful pri-
marily as a means to get around the federal jurisdiction requirements of complete diver-
sity of citizenship and individual satisfaction of jurisdictional amount by each plaintiff's 
claim. Moore & Cohn, supra note 201, at 318-21. For him, the spurious class action grew 
out of existing trends towards more liberal joinder embodied elsewhere in the Federal 
Rules. E.g., FED. R. C,v. P. 18-22. 
Moore also conceived of a somewhat limited role for the other types of class actions. 
The frequency of true class actions apparently declined because states had enacted laws 
permitting unincorporated associations to sue and be sued in their own name. (Rule 17 
applied these statutes to federal cases.) The hybrid class action, which covered creditors' 
bills, declined because of modern bankruptcy procedures. Moore & Cohn, supra note 
201, at 314-17; see supra notes 200-01 (describing hybrid class actions). 
206. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 684-86, 720-21; see Comment, The 
Class Action Device in Antisegregation Cases, 20 U. Cm. L. REV. 577, 578-83, 592 (1953). 
207. Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 199. The increase may also have resulted from the 
enactment of New Deal legislation, which provided substantive bases for class action 
plaintiffs to sue. See Moore & Cohn, supra note 201, at 307-08 (noting increase in class 
action litigation in decade before 1938 and attributing it to recent federal legislation). 
208. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 692; Comment, supra note 206, at 577 
Oinking increase to applicability of Rule 23 class actions in general); Note, Class Actions: 
A Study of Group Interest Litigation, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 991 (1956) (same). 
209. E.g., Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
U.S. 960 (1966); Schutte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 183 
F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950). 
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a finding of liability,210 even months or years after the liability 
proceedings,211 to take advantage of relief. 
The 1966 revision of the class action rules nevertheless abol-
ished the spurious class action and its nonbinding feature. The 
framers of the revision believed that the 1938 Rule violated the 
fairness concerns embodied in the rule of mutuality of estop-
pel.212 They objected to the one-way binding effect of the spuri-
ous class action, which bound the defendant to the judgment by 
res judicata without binding the plaintiff class. 213 
B. A Proposal 
The proposal advanced here is the elimination of the binding 
effect of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action. In essence, this proposal 
would return the situation to that which existed before 1966, 
when the spurious class action was an available device for group 
litigation. This proposal removes the due process objection to 
the Rule 23(b)(2) class action. At the same time, it preserves the 
benefits of Rule 23(b)(2): the ability of a person suing on behalf 
of a class of unnamed persons to get an injunction against a 
public policy and obtain associated financial or other additional 
relief for all; to have all the relief easily enforceable through con-
tempt proceedings by anyone affected by the policy; and to take 
advantage, if necessary, of the special rules against dismissal for 
mootness in class actions. 
210. E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 
1962), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 
529 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers 
v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. 24 F.R.D. 510, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
211. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 669 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 
138 (6th Cir. 1968); see System Fed'n No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991, 998-99 (6th Cir. 
1950) (case decided ostensibly under Rule 23(a)(l)). 
212. See supra notes 1, 105 and accompanying text. An additional reason was the 
confusion in deciding whether a case fit within the spurious case subdivision, and so 
lacked preclusive effect on absentees, or whether it could be classified instead as "true" 
or "hybrid" having preclusive effect. Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 98. The awkward 
terminology that Moore adapted from Street may also have hastened the old Rule's end. 
Nearly everyone made fun of the term "spurious." E.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 
173, at 707 n.73 ("[T)he plaintiff must stubbornly insist that he has a spurious suit 
against the equally stubborn insistence of the defendant that it is not spurious .... [l]t 
is imperative that the class suit of sub-paragraph (a)(3) be saved from the damnation of 
the faint, faint praise carried by the word 'spurious.' ") 
213. As most commentators noted, no member of a defendant class would use post-
decision joinder to share in a judgment he would have opposed. E.g., Z. CHAFFEE, supra 
note 112, at 278 n.53, 284. 
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The exact form in which the spurious class action should be 
revived merits some consideration. One possibility would be to 
leave Rule 23(b)(2) unchanged, but have courts refuse to give 
Rule 23(b)(2) unwanted preclusive effects on absentees in any 
case in which adequate notice and the opportunity to opt out 
had not been given. One court allowed a subsequent suit by a 
member of a class in a Rule 23(b)(2) employment discrimination 
action involving significant monetary relief. The court reasoned 
that the original case resembled a Rule 23(b)(3) class action and 
that more adequate notice should therefore have been given. 214 
In a variety of other cases, courts have simply refused to pre-
clude individuals on the ground that there was no notice, with-
out considering the contrary intention of Rule 23(b)(2).2111 The 
Rule itself does not use the word preclude, or the words res judi-
cata, though the Advisory Committee Note and the associated 
commentary do. The Rule merely says that the judgment in a 
class "shall include and describe those whom the court finds to 
be members of the class."216 Perhaps the Advisory Committee 
kept clearer language out of the text of the Rule because of lin-
gering concern that specifying res judicata effects would over-
step the boundary of procedure into substantive rights; this was 
the reason for the Committee's rejection of a subparagraph of 
the 1938 Rule 23 describing the res judicata effect of each subdi-
vision.217 In any event, an interpretation limiting the Rule to its 
innocuous language, "include and describe . . . members of the 
class," is available to a court anxious to avoid either violating 
the due process rights of absentees or declaring Rule 23 uncon-
stitutional in whole or in part. The court could state its belief 
that no res judicata effect can apply without notice and the right 
to opt out, no matter who is included or described in the final 
judgment. 
214. Penson v. Terminal Trans. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1981). 
215. Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1008 (7th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. General Motors 
Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 408-09 (5th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); Gary A. v. New Trier High School, 1983-84 
Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) 555:376 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd in part and reu'd in 
part on other grounds, 796 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1986). 
216. Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(3) with Rule 23 Notes, supra note 1, at 105. See 
generally 38 J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 11 23.02-1 (2d ed. 1987) (stating 
that res judicata effect was intended by subdivision (c)(3)). 
217. See supra note 203. This objection sounds odd today. It appears that the federal 
rules inevitably affect the application of res judicata. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 13, 41. 
Significant new research may shed additional light on the substance/procedure dichot-
omy and Congress's original intentions regarding the coverage of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982). 
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An alternative solution would be to amend the Rule. 218 The 
Rule is ripe for amendment, in light of twenty-two years of var-
ied experience under it. As an amendment, the reform proposed 
here builds on existing interest in revision of the Rule and has 
the advantage of not attempting to challenge or overrule any di-
rect, recent Supreme Court precedent.219 The amendment might 
state directly that a judgment in a subdivision (b)(2) class action 
where notice and the right to opt out were not given would be 
without prejudice to the rights of members of the class who were 
not class representatives.220 Or it might simply delete the lan-
guage in subdivision (c)(3) making the favorable or unfavorable 
218. What is at issue here is an action that the Supreme Court should take in its 
legislative capacity of promulgating rules, rather than in its capacity of deciding concrete 
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (giving power to Supreme Court to prescribe rules for 
practice and procedure of, inter alia, district courts, subject to reporting of rules to Con-
gress 90 days before they take effect). Perhaps the Rule should be changed simply to 
enhance the protections of litigants, even if the existing procedures meet due process 
requirements. 
219. In 1985, the American Bar Association Litigation Section proposed a compre-
hensive revision of Rule 23, but the revision failed to obtain full ABA approval. It was 
submitted to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, as was an adverse report from the 
ABA Antitrust Section. See Section of Litig., American Bar Ass'n, supra note 190, (text 
of proposal and commentary). See generally supra note 190 (discussing flaws in the pro-
posal). There is other movement towards revision as well. See, e.g., Coffee, Rethinking 
the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987); Mullenix, supra 
note 8 (proposing revisions); Arthur Miller Describes Federal Rules Revision Process, 
Changes in Law School Environment, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1986, at 1, 9-10 (describing 
time as ripe for revision). 
220. The amendment thus might be to have subdivision (c)(3) read: 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision 
(b)(l) or (b)(2) shall describe those whom the court finds to be members of the 
class, but in all actions maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(l) or 
(b)(2), the judgment, whether or not favorable to the class, shall be without 
prejudice to the rights of all unnamed class members who do not receive individ-
ual notice advising them that (A) the court will exclude them from the class if 
they so request by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, 
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any members 
who do not request exclusion may, if they desire, enter an appearance through 
counsel. 
This amendment says approximately what the 1842 Equity Rule 48 said, but the 
greater specification of applicability, "in all actions maintained as class actions under 
subdivision ... (b)(2)," would help prevent results like Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 
(16 How.) 288 (1853). See generally supra note 195 (describing Equity Rule 48 and 
Smith). The "without prejudice" language borrows from FED. R. C1v. P. 41 and is pre-
sumably no more vulnerable to a challenge that it oversteps the boundaries of procedure 
than Rule 41, or for that matter, than the present Rule 23. 
The notice language comes from the present Rule 23(c)(2), pluralized to permit the use 
of the word "all" in the without prejudice phrase. The rule withholds res judicata effect 
wherever the notice has not actually been received. The requirement of actual receipt 
may exceed the bare due process minimum. See supra note 140. This requirement is still 
consistent with practice under Rule 23(b)(3) and enhances fairness with only minor cost 
in terms of finality. 
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judgment "include" all class members.221 This latter possibility 
would count on the courts to adopt the due process reasoning set 
forth above and to hold, as a matter of interpretation of the 
Rule consistent with due process, that no class member who 
does not receive notice and the right to opt out will be bound by 
the judgment in a Rule 23(b)(2) action.222 
The language also covers Rule 23(b)(l) class actions, which are covered under the pre-
sent subdivision (c)(3). These rare actions, which are outside the main scope of this Arti-
cle, share some of the characteristics of Rule 23(b)(2) institutional cases and therefore 
should probably be handled in the same manner. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (proof of limited fund required for subdivi-
sion (b)(l) to be applicable); LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466-67 
(9th Cir. 1973) (restricting use of subdivision (b)(l) to limited fund interpleader-type 
cases). See generally Mullenix, supra note 8, at 1053-54 (stating that the limited fund is 
necessary and that judicial controversy regarding limited fund and other issues renders 
subdivision (b)(l) difficult to use in mass tort cases). 
The language of the proposed revision also covers subdivision (b)(2) defendant classes. 
Although some courts have found Rule 23(b)(2) inapplicable to cases naming defendant 
classes, e.g., Henson v. East Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir.), cert. 
granted 108 S. Ct. 283 (1987); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 709 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th 
Cir. 1983), others have permitted application of this subdivision, e.g., Doss v. Long, 93 
F.R.D. 112, 118-20 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Whether defendant class actions are consistent with 
the subdivision or not is beyond the scope of this Ar.ticle. But to the extent that due 
process requires notice for a binding adjudication of the claims of absent plaintiff class 
members, requiring the same for absent defendant class members seems sensible. They 
have a protected interest at stake, as do plaintiff class members. Alternative safeguards 
are equally unreliable for them. In fact, these safeguards may be even less reliable, be-
cause the opposing party designates the class representative. For a contrary view, see 
Note, supra note 8, at 1398-99 (arguing that homogeneity of the defendant class ensures 
representative adequacy and that implied consent exists for representation if the repre-
sentation is adequate; but not considering due process minimum standards beyond ade-
quacy of representation and not considering Mathews v. Eldridge factors). 
Consider also that the social utility of defendant class actions is not nearly as well 
established as that of plaintiff class actions. Therefore, if heightened due process protec-
tions limit the use of the procedure, it is less clear that on balance any loss will result. 
The proposal in this Article permits the parties to choose either a decree that does not 
bind the absent class members with no prejudgment notice, or a decree that does, if 
notice and the right to opt out are afforded. One of the parties could choose the notice 
option and voluntarily pay for it. The named defendant in a defendant class action has a 
strong incentive to do so if it fears entry of liability for plaintiff's attorneys fees and 
wants contribution from the other potential defendants. Moreover, the named defendant 
could be ordered to pay for notice after a finding of liability against it, if under the facts 
of the case, notice to the defendant class constitutes relief that will eliminate the effects 
of illegal conduct in which the representative itself engaged. See infra text accompanying 
notes 248-56 (discussing similar procedures for plaintiff classes in institutional cases). 
The difficulty of such a plan in a defendant class context is that everyone who under-
stands the notice will probably opt out. 
221. Revised in this way, subdivision (c)(3) would read: "(3) The judgment in an ac-
tion maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(l) or (b)(2) shall describe those 
whom the court finds to be members of the class." 
222. Like the 1938 Rule, neither of these alternatives explicitly allows or disallows 
post-decision intervention to take advantage of the relief. A court might rely on the pre-
cedent under the 1938-66 Rule 23 to permit it. But Rule 71 provides the easier route of 
enforcement of judgments by unnamed class members. It allows that "[w]hen an order is 
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1. The mutuality objection- The most obvious objection to 
this proposal, in any of its various forms, is that it undoes what 
the 1966 Rule did. It permits one-way binding results in class 
actions. But whatever power this mutuality argument had 
twenty-two years ago, it would not seem to have any now. For 
years, academics have challenged the reasons behind the mutu-
ality doctrine,223 and for the last forty-six of those years, courts 
have joined in the chorus. In 1942, in Bernhard v. Bank of 
America, 224 the California Supreme Court permitted nonmutual 
defensive collateral estoppel over the objection that it was not 
fair to have one party bound when the other party had never 
been at risk of being bound. The United States Supreme Court 
adopted this position in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. 
University of Illinois Foundation225 in 1971, and then followed, 
eight years later, with a decision calling for nonmutual offensive 
collateral estoppel. Parklane Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore226 appears to 
have disposed completely of the objection that a judgment 
should never bind a defendant if the plaintiff in a second suit 
was not at risk of being bound. Even the Restatement of Judg-
ments has fallen in line.227 Indeed, mutuality continues to reign 
supreme only in Rule 23, where it was enthroned before the de-
posals elsewhere.228 
made in favor of a person who is not a party to an action, he may enforce obedience to 
the order by the same process as if he were a party." FED R. C,v. P. 71. The court's 
description of the class in the judgment can specify the persons in whose favor the order 
was made. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text; infra note 228. The proposed 
rule avoids the use of the "accursed label[]" spurious. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 
173, at 707 n.73 (1941); see supra note 212. 
223. E.g., Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE 
L.J. 607, 611 (1926). Such challenges probably originated with Jeremy Bentham. Id. at 
609 n.11; see J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843 & reprint 1962). This criticism extends to the class 
action context. E.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 713; Developments in the 
Law-Class Actions, supra note 120, at 1395-96. 
224. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
225. 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (approving the use of nonmutual defensive collateral estop-
pel in patent litigation where prior judgment existed adverse to patentee and patentee 
now sued another, unrelated defendant with identical allegations of infringement). 
226. 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (applying offensive collateral estoppel in stockholders' class 
action over securities fraud where prior adjudication against defendants had been made 
in government's suit). Parklane did hold, however, that a district court retains some 
limited discretion to refuse to apply offensive collateral estoppel. Id. at 331. 
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). Nevertheless, some state 
courts have rejected the application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. E.g., 
Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 484, 562 P.2d 360, 364 (1977); Howell v. 
Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co. 386 Mich. 37, 52, 191 N.W.2d 313, 320 (1971). 
228. Already, something of a guerilla movement exists to subvert the binding effect of 
Rule 23(b)(2) on class actions. There are two fronts to this assault. 
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Even characterizing this objection as one of "mutuality" gives 
away too much to the objector. The situation of the absent Rule 
23(b)(2) class member and that of the adverse party are hardly 
"mutual." A fundamental difference exists between a 'litigant 
who knows about a case and participates in it and a "litigant" 
who has never even heard of the proceeding. The only thing mu-
tual to the two parties is the binding effect of the current rule. 
The real unfairness is binding the person who has no knowledge 
of the case. 229 
A somewhat more specific mutuality objection may be made 
with respect to Rule 23(b)(2) class actions against the federal 
government. In United States v. Mendoza,230 a 1984 decision, 
First, class representatives are waiting later and later in their cases to obtain certifica-
tion. See, e.g., Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 838 F.2d 962 (7th Cir 1988) (delaying certifi-
cation more than three years); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1980) (de-
laying certification until after judgment). In cases with no significant disputed issues of 
fact, the plaintiffs often submit to the court one combined motion for class certification 
and summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Defendants, of course, oppose both. The 
class representative thus has a fair prospect that if the court finds for the defendant on 
liability, it will also find for the defendant on the class certification. The judgment then 
binds the class representative alone. 
Second, many litigants settle cases at the precertification stage, even when the settle-
ment runs in favor of the class as a whole. The named plaintiffs in such actions have 
standing on their own to obtain broad injunctive relief, the decrees obtained being en-
forceable by all those in whose favor the consent decree was made, namely, the uncerti-
fied class's members, under FED. R. C1v. P. 71, see supra notes 45, 222 and accompanying 
text. In these Rule 71 settlements, the consent decrees may contain elaborate provisions 
for the benefit of the persons who would have been class members. E.g., John A. v. Gill, 
No. 81-C-2456 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1983) (consent decree); Alford v. Illinois Dep't of Reha-
bilitation Servs., No. 83-C-9301 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1984) (consent decree). Under Rule 
23(c)(3), a class action precludes the class members where the judgment defines and in-
cludes the class. When the final judgment involves no certification, it has no binding 
effect on any class. See Almond, Settling Rule 23 Class Actions at the Precertifi.cation 
Stage: Is Notice Required?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 303, 303-05 (1978) (asserting that class repre-
sentatives exploit absence of classwide effect to extort personal settlements before certifi-
cation). The fact that defendants often agree to settlements of this type, which do not 
bind the class, suggests that the value of preclusion to defendants is overstated. Defend-
ants realize that considerations of practical advantage induce potential class members to 
opt into already secured relief, even when they might prefer something more. Similar 
prudential concerns often apply in unsuccessful class actions, even without binding ef-
fect. Relatively few plaintiffs will have the temerity to sue when someone else has lost. 
See generally Dam, supra note 8, at 125 (arguing from this premise and that of the 
decline of the importance of mutuality that "it is therefore worth considering scrapping 
the 1966 amendment," at least regarding subdivision (b)(3)); Wilton, supra note 31, at 
599-600. The current proposal, of course, protects the temerarious. 
229. See Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 713 (" [T]here is by no means com-
plete symmetry between binding the defendant to a favorable decree and binding the 
absentee to an unfavorable decree. Clearly, the defendant has been afforded his day in 
court .... But it cannot be said that the absentee has had his day in court .... "). 
230. 464 U.S. 154 (1984). As noted above, some aspects of the Mendoza reasoning 
argue against offensive collateral estoppel of state and local governments. See supra text 
accompanying note 44. To the extent that these arguments carry, the objection to the 
406 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:3 
the Supreme Court created an exception to the Parklane rule 
for cases involving offensive assertion of nonmutual collateral es-
toppel against the federal government. The Court reasoned that 
nonmutual collateral estoppel was unwise given the geographic 
breadth of government litigation, the unique nature of some of 
the issues the government litigates, and the political aspect of 
decisions not to file appeals. 231 The Court thought that applying 
offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel might prevent the gov-
ernment from creating a conflict among circuits in order to ob-
tain Supreme Court review of important legal questions, particu-
larly those unique to the government, all perhaps because of a 
soon-disavowed political decision not to appeal.232 Arguing from 
Mendoza, the government might contend that, just as it should 
retain the protection of mutuality of estoppel in general, it 
should retain it in the context of Rule 23. 
It is doubtful that the absence of mutuality under the propo-
sal advanced here would have any effect on the government's 
ability to develop the law in areas of special governmental con-
cern. The Supreme Court has already approved the practice of 
certifying national classes in cases against the federal govern-
ment. 233 Such a class would ordinarily include all individuals 
with an interest in litigating a particular issue. Accordingly, cer-
tification of a national class and entry of a binding final judg-
ment that encompasses the government and all individuals stops 
the development of case law on the issue. 234 To the extent that 
any persons exist outside the class and in a different judicial cir-
cuit who still might litigate an issue, development of the law is 
possible under the current law as well as under the proposal ad-
vanced here.2311 In fact, the proposed amendment offers greater 
opportunities for development of the law, though in a manner 
reform proposal includes both state and federal governments. Nevertheless, the same 
responses to the objections apply whether or not the issue is exclusively one for the fed-
eral government. 
231. 464 U.S. at 159-61. 
232. Mendoza involved immigration, a topic in which the federal government has a 
unique interest. The government disavowed the political decision not to appeal. Id. at 
157 n.2. 
233. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979) (finding no abuse of discretion in 
certification of national class attacking procedures for recoupment of social security 
overpayments). 
234. This issue constituted the thrust of the government's argument in Yamasaki. Id. 
at 701-02. 
235. Nothing proposed here would permit persons outside the class to take advantage 
of class relief to any greater extent than they can today. The proposal merely eliminates 
the binding effect on class members who do not want to be bound. It retains the require-
ments for definition of the class currently in Rule 23. 
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that the government might not welcome. Under the current rule, 
if the class loses, no one in the class can develop the law by filing 
a separate action and taking appeals that the class representa-
tive did not take in the original case. Under the reform proposal, 
disgruntled class members may relitigate, just as the government 
wanted to do in Mendoza, with the same positive effect on legal 
development. 236 The only question, then, is whether the negative 
effect that class actions have on the development of the law is 
justified under the current rule of determinations binding the 
class and not justified-under the proposed rule of determinations 
not binding the class. 
In some contexts, mutuality raises an important fairness con-
cern. In United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,237 a case de-
cided the same day as Mendoza, the Court ruled that the pres-
ence of mutuality justifies the application of defensive collateral 
estoppel against the federal government. It would have been un-
fair to drag the same litigant through a court case to establish 
something that that particular litigant has already gone through 
the process to establish. This fairness consideration thus im-
poses a limit on the reach of the government's protection from 
collateral estoppel. Fairness is a competing policy concern and 
prevails over the policies of freedom for political decision-mak-
ing in litigation and of development of the law on unique gov-
ernmental issues. 
In the present inquiry, however, the only fairness considera-
tion weighing in favor of mutuality is one that applies to the 
federal government. Given an inevitable hindrance to the devel-
opment of the law, the enhanced fairness to the government of 
having the class take the gamble of being bound in one litigation 
does not justify the diminished fairness to absent class members 
of having their causes of action decided without notice and the 
236. This procedure entails a negative effect on judicial economy, but not one unique 
to the operation of the proposal in federal gover!lment cases. Moreover, the Mendoza 
rule, by permitting the government to relitigate issues, entails costs in judicial resources. 
The costs would grow even larger if the Mendoza holding were extended to assertions of 
defensive collateral estoppel against the government. See infra note 237. 
237. 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984). In Stauffer, the defendant challenged the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's use of private inspectors who had not agreed to hold trade 
secrets confidential. After the company won that case, the Agency tried the same prac-
tice at a different factory of Stauffer's. The Court applied defensive collateral estoppel 
against the Agency. Mendoza was a case of offensive collateral estoppel. The holding 
appears limited to offensive collateral estoppel, though some language suggests applica-
tion to nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel as well. United States v, Mendoza, 464 
U.S. 154, 160, 163 (1984). 
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right to be heard.238 In the first place, the government is at least 
aware of the situation from the outset. In any class action, it 
knows from receipt of the complaint that the result will have 
greater significance than that of an individual case.239 It also 
knows that if the class is national or otherwise defined to encom-
pass all potential litigants on one or more issues, there will be no 
second chance to win. Accordingly, it should allocate greater re-
sources to the case. But the absent class member has no way of 
even knowing about the case, much less treating it as a chance 
that will never come again to assert a valuable legal right. Some 
tradeoff is inevitable. This one should be made to the individ-
ual's benefit. 
It must also be remembered that the government can 
purchase additional fairness for itself by paying for prejudgment 
notice to the members of the class. Where the court provides 
notice and the right to opt out, the reform proposal would per-
mit all class members so notified who do not opt out to be pre-
cluded by the result of the litigation.240 The class members, ig-
norant of what is going on, are in no position to make such a 
purchase, even if they could afford it. If the representative were 
forced to make the purchase for them, absence of funds would 
defeat class actions in the very instances in which they are most 
valuable. 241 
238. In this context, the term is actually misleading. It makes the absent class mem-
ber and the defendant seem similarly situated when the defendant can in fact protect 
itself. See supra text accompanying note 229. 
239. Indeed, the government's disregard of individual case precedent, due in part to 
the Mendoza restriction on application of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, is a 
major reason for use of Rule 23(b)(2) right now. See supra notes 41-44 and accompany-
ing text. 
240. The pre-1966 spurious class action made the same procedure available. See 
Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 173, at 714 n.91 ("A possible solution, if the defendant 
wants to quiet claims by making the suit res judicata, would be to place on him the 
burden of notifying all absentees and thus affording them an opportunity to intervene 
.... "). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), only presents an obstacle to 
placing the cost of notice on defendant involuntarily. The defendant can always agree to 
pay the cost of notice given under subdivision (d)(2) of Rule 23, which provides generally 
that the court may order that notice be given to class members whenever appropriate. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 23(d)(2). A difficulty arises if any of those receiving notice opt out. They 
would thus retain their ability to file subsequent actions. The defendants then have the 
options to sue those opting out for declaratory relief or to add them as parties needed for 
a just adjudication under FED. R. C1v. P. 19. See infra text accompanying notes 250-51. 
For the view that the right to participate, not to opt out, is the due process minimum 
in class actions, see Keefe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 155, at 345-48 (asserting that 
this minimum applies where territorial jurisdiction is not otherwise established); Miller 
& Crump, supra note 134, at 31 (asserting that the minimum applies generally). 
241. An additional reason for eliminating the preclusive effect on class members who 
do not receive notice lies in the possibility that misguided courts may bar claims for 
monetary relief by the result in the class action. The leading example of this is Interna-
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2. A specialized application: institutional cases- In institu-
tional actions brought under Rule 23(b)(2), preclusion of the 
class has a valuable function. In institutional cases, the plaintiffs 
seek to change a wide range of conditions that affect all persons 
caught up in a particular social setting, such as a school system, 
prison, mental hospital, or, in some instances, a place of employ-
ment. 242 In these cases, there are divergent interests among the 
many groups affected by the litigation; no single solution is 
likely to fulfill all the entitlements, much less all the desires, of 
every group. Compromise is thus necessary, and it is desirable to 
have a binding compromise that will not be attacked after signif-
icant costs are incurred to achieve and implement it. 243 
tional Prisoners Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973), where the court held 
that a class action filed by prisoners in state court to correct unconstitutional conditions 
of confinement operated by its final decree to foreclose individual prisoners' claims for 
monetary relief for mistreatment. The risk is that a court in a damages case subsequent 
to a subdivision (b)(2) action for policy changes or institutional reform may act in a 
similar manner and apply the class decree to bar the suit. On the face of the 1966 Rule, 
such a result is unwarranted. Subdivision (b)(2) is only meant for "injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." Moreover, to the 
extent that the cause of action in the class case may include issues relating to damages 
claims among the issues that can be raised (and so may be barred), class certification 
would not be appropriate under subdivision (b)(2) for those issues. Under subdivision 
(c)(4) of the Rule, "[w]hen appropriate, ... an action may be brought or maintained as 
a class action with respect to particular issues." Thus in any subdivision (b)(2) case, it 
seems sensible to interpret the scope of the certification to be restricted to the claims for 
monetary relief. See Bodensteiner, Application of Preclusion Principles to § 1983 Dam-
age Actions After a Successful Class Action for Equitable Relief, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 347 
(1983). 
Courts confronting cases of this type nonetheless have had a surprisingly difficult time 
finding a rationale for avoiding preclusion. Both the Fifth Circuit in Bogard v. Cook, 586 
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978), and the Seventh Circuit in Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (7th 
Cir. 1982), have held that previous class actions for prospective relief do not bar prison-
ers' damages actions. Each court first reasoned that the prisoners had not been given 
adequate notice of any right either to adjudicate their damages claims in the class action 
or to request to be excluded from the class. This rationale forms an odd basis for the 
result, because under Rule 23(b)(2) the prisoners could not have been excluded from the 
class upon demand and had no right to notice except of settlement. The error in this 
reasoning permits future courts to reject the Fifth and Seventh Circuit cases as wrongly 
decided on the notice afforded by subdivision (b)(2) and then themselves make wrong 
applications of preclusion principles to bar class members' subsequent damages actions. 
The courts in Bogard and Crowder advanced far more persuasive alternative reasoning. 
The Fifth Circuit supplemented its discussion of notice by stating that the injection of 
monetary claims into the class action would have rendered it so complex as to have de-
stroyed it. Bogard, 586 F.2d at 408-09. The Seventh Circuit stated that it would have 
been unfair to have required a prisoner to opt out of the classwide relief for the sake of a 
future damages action. Crowder, 687 F.2d at 1009. Unfortunately, a cursory reading of 
the opinions might miss these arguments altogether. The mere fact that the present rule 
can be misinterpreted may not itself justify the amendment of Rule 23. But ending erro-
neous preclusion of monetary claims is a significant side benefit of the proposed reform. 
242. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 68-79. 
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These factors make a binding determination imperative; addi-
tional factors make participation of the groups affected by the 
order an affirmative value in itself. Participation is especially 
important in the formulation of relief. Not only is relief the fo-
cus of the most divergent and strongly felt of interests, but it is 
the aspect of the case in which the court's activities are the most 
difficult. In order to formulate relief that will impose significant 
changes in an ongoing social institution without causing unnec-
essary disruption, the court may need to draw on the expertise 
of persons involved in the institution who have not previously 
been parties to the lawsuit. 244 These persons are likely to have 
their own concerns, and may not be as cooperative as they might 
be if they know that the proceeding in which they are participat-
ing will preclusively affect their own interests.245 Moreover, both 
those people with essential information and many of those with-
out it may be in a position to subvert whatever decree resolves 
the case. Unless they are made parties or otherwise subjected to 
injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), 
they will be difficult to stop.246 It is also possible that when their 
comments have been solicited, and interests at least partially ac-
commodated, they may be less inclined to attempt to undermine 
the decree. 247 
All this does not mean that the entire list of affected groups 
has to participate actively in the proceeding from the very start. 
It is characteristic of institutional cases to have distinct liability 
and relief phases.248 The liability phase is frequently uncon-
tested. 249 Even where it is contested, liability can often be estab-
244. Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 784, 909 (1978) (collecting cases); see Rhode, supra note 45, at 1226; 
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 120, at 1308. 
245. See Note, supra note 68, at 439. 
246. Yeazell, supra note 69, at 257-59; Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Repre-
sentation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1478 (1982). 
247. Special Project, supra note 244, at 910; Note, supra note 68, at 440. 
248. Chayes, supra note 26, at 1282-83; Note, supra note 68, at 437-38. 
249. 
[T]he finding of a constitutional violation is in a practical sense only the prelimi-
nary hurdle. The heart of the lawsuit is the remedial stage, where the parties 
struggle, often for years, over the scope and details of injunctive relief. Under 
such circumstances it is not uncommon for the parties to take no appeal from 
the initial liability determination . . . because they recognize the wisdom of hus-
banding their energy and resources for the true battleground. 
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 690 F.2d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Yeazell, 
supra note 69, at 257 (In institutional cases of some types, "the focus of litigation tends 
to shift: The question is less whether events have occurred which give rise to liability 
under the substantive rules of law than how a remedy is to be framed."); Rhode, supra 
note 45, at 1217 (addressing defendants' failure to raise adequacy of representation of 
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lished without the participation of the full range of persons af-
fected by possible remedial options. In the relief phase, the need 
for participation becomes pressing. 
Under the reform proposal, a court might handle institutional 
cases somewhat differently from policy cases. In the policy cases, 
the court would define the class before a finding of liability, and 
dissatisfied class members would retain the right to file a sepa-
rate lawsuit after relief has been entered. Notice might be 
needed for the implementation of relief, particularly in cases 
where benefits are claimed by mailing in a claims form accompa-
nying a notice. But the notice would be sent after completion of 
the remedial proceedings, as part of the implementation of the 
final judgment. Those who do not take advantage of the relief 
would not be bound. 
In an institutional case, the court might provide notice as par-
tial relief after an adjudication of liability but before a decision 
on the comprehensive, ultimate remedy. The class would be de-
fined early in the case, but the definition itself would not have a 
binding effect. Instead, the notice would permit the class mem-
bers to be bound by the end result. Where class members opt 
out upon receiving notice and there is realistic fear that these 
persons will file subsequent litigation that will disrupt the re-
sults of the current case, the class representatives or the defend-
ant could use Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
join them as parties needed for a just adjudication.2110 Obviously, 
this strategy would work only if relatively few persons opt out. 
In instances where large numbers opt out, it might be necessary 
to define distinct subclasses and renotify those opting out, tell-
ing them of the formation of a new class to represent their inter-
ests and asking whether they still wish to be excluded. This re-
finement should reduce the number of objectors to a level where 
the plaintiff class: "In some desegregation and deinstitutionalization cases, defendants 
have depended on lawsuits to compel what they 'would like to do but lack the political 
courage to accomplish on their own'" (quoting Kirp, The Bounded Politics of School 
Desegregation Litigation, 51 HARV. Eouc. REV. 395, 402 (1981))). 
250. FED. R. C,v. P. 19 (Joinder of Persons Needed for a Just Adjudication). This rule 
is based on the traditional equity principle that all parties to a controversy must be 
before the court before the case will proceed. The rule has been updated to permit a 
more practical approach than the old equity principle. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL 
CouRTS 461-62 (4th ed. 1983). 
The fact that Rule 19 provides the ultimate resolution when persons opt out of institu-
tional class actions is somewhat ironic. Some commentators have traced the development 
of the class action as a circumvention of the traditional equity rule requiring joinder of 
all concerned in a case. E.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 112, at 200-01. But see Yeazell, supra 
note 120, at 868-71 (disputing Chafee theory in general). 
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they can be individually joined or, perhaps, ignored as an insig-
nificant threat to the finality of the proceedings. 2111 
The fact that notice is ordered after a finding of liability dis-
tinguishes this procedure from the one disapproved in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin. 252 Because the defendant has been found 
to be liable after full hearing, there can be no objection to im-
posing on the defendant the cost of notice required to imple-
ment full relief. Eisen involved a preliminary and unauthorized 
finding of likelihood of liability.253 The finding in Eisen, how-
ever, was not made after a complete hearing on liability, with 
plenary procedural rights for the defendant.254 
Notifying all class members may induce some of them, partic-
ularly those whose interests are not aligned with the class repre-
sentatives, to petition for intervention, and to threaten to opt 
out unless intervention is permitted. This may cause the court 
to certify subclasses of these intervenors. In this situation, and 
in situations where subclasses of previous opters-out are formed, 
the case will take on the polygonal aspect common to institu-
tional litigation, if it has not done so already. Under these cir-
cumstances, the court may order notice to persons beyond those 
in the originally-defined class, soliciting intervention petitions or 
other requests for participation from all those in a position to 
facilitate or to obstruct final relief. 21111 This entails the introduc-
tion of yet more testimony and otherwise drags out proceedings, 
but the dilatory effect will be less than that which might occur 
because of obstruction of the decree by nonparticipants affected 
by it.256 Similarly, the effect will be less disruptive than what 
would happen if a class member not bound by the decree filed a 
separate suit for contrary relief after the original relief had been 
implemented. If the defendant fears a finding of liability and 
251. Because it only takes one objector to file a subsequent action, the parties might 
need to pay special attention to who the objectors are and why they may have chosen to 
opt out. 
252. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
253. Id. at 177. 
254. See Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (approving shift of cost to defendant for discovery consisting of diagnostic 
examinations of victims of airplane disaster after entry of liability on summary 
judgment). 
255. Allowing this kind of intervention may stretch traditional concepts of interven-
tion by permitting the participation of those without traditional legal interests or those 
whose interests might seem to be represented by others. See Y eazell, supra note 69, at 
255-60; Note, supra note 246, at 1484-88. A judge may also explore less formal par-
ticipatory options, such as "litigating amici" who lack full intervenor status. See Yeazell, 
supra note 69, at 260 n.69. 
256. See Yeazell, supra note 69, at 258. 
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wants to minimize protracted remedial proceedings, it might vol-
untarily pay for notice to the class and other affected parties 
before the trial of the liability phase of the case. The court 
might then entertain requests for intervention and the forma-
tion of subclasses and conduct a single trial on both liability and 
relief. If the parties wish to create a binding pretrial settlement 
of the case, the defendant might agree to pay for notice to all 
class members affording each the right to opt out. Where opting 
out occurs, the parties might add the dissidents under Rule 19. 
They could still object to settlement at that point, but only if 
they assumed responsibility for actively litigating. 
CONCLUSION 
A revision of either the language or judicial interpretation of 
Rule 23(b)(2) to eliminate its binding effect on class members 
preserves the due process interests of absent class members 
without imposing costly and self-defeating notice requirements. 
This reform permits subdivision (b)(2) to continue its important 
role in the world of public law litigation. A reform imposing 
mandatory notice would not. The mutuality objection to the re-
form proposed here is one whose time has passed. Mutuality of 
estoppel is no longer a hallmark of procedural fairness. It is in-
stead an unnecessary encumbrance imposed by past doctrine. 
The only objection to the proposal based on modern concepts of 
fairness to the defendant relates to its weakening of the federal 
government's rights to preclusion. But mutuality here simply 
confers an unjustified litigative advantage on a defendant who 
can protect itself against unnamed plaintiff class members who 
cannot protect themselves in the same way. 
In institutional cases, where there is some general benefit from 
preclusion of class members, the proposal permits preclusion, 
but only after class members' rights are protected by notice and 
the right to opt out. By delaying notice until after a finding of 
liability, the court in an institutional case can preserve the pro-
tected interests of the class members and still impose the costs 
of notice on the defendant without any unfair damage to its 
interests. 
The proposal advanced here is not the only reform of Rule 23 
vying for adoption. One committee has proposed elimination of 
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the classification of the three (b) subdivisions altogether.2117 An-
other commentator recently proposed significant revisions in 
subdivision (b)(3).m However, this reform proposal has the 
unique advantage of focusing attention on the problem of pre-
clusion and its relevance to the class action practice of today 
under subdivision (b)(2). Without better justifications for the 
preclusive effects of class actions than those advanced by the 
Advisory Committee in 1966 or mentioned here as potential ob-
jections to this proposal, the preclusive effects of Rule 23(b)(2) 
class actions ought to be abolished under any new scheme. 
There is no reason to retain preclusion except in institutional 
cases, and the reasons to retain it there apply only to the relief 
phase of proceedings, where it is fair to place notice costs on the 
class's adversary. 
257. Section of Litig., American Bar Ass'n, supra note 190. See generally supra notes 
190, 219 (discussing ABA proposal). 
258. Mullenix, supra note 8. 
